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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Implementing Art 12 of Directive Seveso II: summary of findings 
 
Context 
The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission is responsible for the coordination of the work 
of the European Working Group on Land Use Planning (hereinafter: EWGLUP), whose mandate is the 
development of Guidelines1 for the implementation of Art 12 of the Seveso II Directive as amended by 
Directive 2003/105/EC. These Guidelines, developed by the EWGLUP and agreed by the Member 
States at the 16th meeting of the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the 
implementation of the Seveso Directive (Porvoo, October 2006), were adopted by the European 
Commission on 7 June 20072. 
 
A preliminary research, exploring the state-of art of the implementation of Art 12 within the 25 
Member States (MS) was conducted in 2004 by the Major Accident Hazard Bureau of JRC in the form 
of a questionnaire-based survey. Final results were collected, analysed and finally updated up to spring 
2007. A group of MS – the Netherlands, Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom – was 
selected for further analysis and invited to comment and revise the result of the investigation.  
 
Aim 
The European Working Group on Land-Use Planning has, in addition to the development of Guidelines 
for implementation of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive, as amended by Directive 105/2003/EC, 
taken part at the development of this document as a supporting tool addressing the issue of LUP in the 
context of hazardous facilities. The document provides supplementary information material describing in 
detail “good LUP practices” available within selected Member States and it has a twofold objective. 
Firstly, it reports the results of the survey concerning “good practice” for LUP in the context of the 
Seveso II. Secondly, it proposes implementation Roadmaps fulfilling Art. 12 requirements. In that 
context it should be noted that its character is purely descriptive and informative and it cannot be used 
for guidance or normative purposes. At the same time, it is believed that the structured information 
provided can substantially help the Seveso competent authorities and planning authorities to deal with 
the land-use planning issue. The document is therefore published in the form of JRC Technical Report. 
 
Key challenges and results  
The MAHB survey on which this document is based was used to outline the state-of-art of the 
implementation of Art 12 of Directive Seveso II within MS practices. Methodological differences and 
procedural characteristics of decisional processes “bridging the gap” between risk analysis and LUP 
were considered useful to inform the elaboration of the forthcoming Guidelines for the implementation 
of Art 12. This document had also the separate aim of delivering “Implementation Roadmaps” fulfilling 
Art 12 requirements as developed in a selected group of MS. “Roadmaps” stands for the decisional 
route connecting the different options of risk assessment in land-use planning and procedural phases of 
decisions, and underlines the profusion of possibilities as developed in MS. In this respect, results of the 
subsequent comparative analysis different risk regulations led to: 
 
1. the identification of four different methodological approaches to cope with the risk-in-LUP 
issue; methods were developed consistent with national regulatory, geographical, economical 
and societal backgrounds as well as the specific “accident history” (lessons learnt, multi-risks, 
national characters, etc) ;  
                                                 
1 Land Use Planning Guidelines in the Context of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC as amended by 
Directive 105/2003/EC, in the following text named “LUP Guidance”. 
2 Commission Decision C(2007)2371 
 3
 
2. the description of different procedural routes connecting actors during decisional processes; in 
this respect, the assignment of roles and responsibilities lies in the pre-existing institutional 
engine as well as in national legal and cultural backgrounds (common law vs. civil law, 
participative processes vs. top-down processes, etc); and  
 
3. the definition of a reference terminology for the issue of risk-in-LUP, with particular regard to 
the definition of vulnerability as a key element of planning evaluations within areas at risk. 
 
A key challenge of the study was the inclusion of environmental vulnerability as an element of the 
concept. A general overview of methods and approaches was reported, together with the proposal of a 
set of general indicators assessing both urban and natural vulnerabilities. For the latter assessment being 
less developed in the European practices further research will be necessary.  
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A. INTRODUCTION 
I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The Control of Urbanization requirement stated in Article 12 of the “Seveso II” Directive (96/82/EC) 
and the mandate, for the European Commission, to elaborate by the end of 2006 guidelines for its 
implementation (1st amendment of the Directive, 2003/105/EC), underlined the need to define a set of 
guiding principles for “bridging the gap” between two traditionally independent domains: major 
accident risk assessment and land-use planning (LUP).  
The strong inter-disciplinary and inter-sector character of this requirement, combining industrial and 
socio-environmental risk assessment in ideally one planning3 intervention, represented a complex 
policy-formulation problem for Member States and the European Union. As a consequence, monitoring 
the status of the implementation of the Seveso II Directive within national regulations has been a central 
task for the Commission.  
In the last ten years, due to the independence of Member States with regard to the implementation of 
Art 12, most MS have developed their own methodological and procedural approach without any 
reference to common guiding principles. The matter of “risk in land-use planning” has therefore a 
strictly national character. From the European regulatory perspective, a survey on national practices is, 
consequently, regarded as a necessary preliminary to any supra-national recommendation. Several 
surveys and monitoring procedures on the transposition and implementation of the Seveso II were 
conducted in the period between 1997 and 2004. The official three-yearly monitoring activity, managed 
by DG ENV, examined the transposition and the implementation of the Directive within national 
legislation and practices, but to date has not covered land-use planning issues. Based on questionnaires, 
as required by specific Commission Decisions, it covered the periods of 1997-1999, 2000-2002, and 
2003-2005. A Commission summary and the Member States' reports are available online4. The 
summary focuses only on a few key aspects like Emergency Planning, Information to the Public and 
Inspections, whereas further details on land-use-planning can be found in some national reports. 
A recent survey, based on the submission of a new questionnaire to all the 25 national Competent 
Authorities and focusing on the implementation of the “control of urbanization” requirement in detail, 
was launched in the first half of 2004 by the Major Hazard Accident Bureau of the Joint Research 
Centre of the European Commission. The questionnaire was built upon the activities of the European 
Working Group for Land Use Planning (EWGLUP) coordinated by JRC. This document is based on the 
collection and elaboration of the results, which were periodically revised by the EWGLUP during 
sessions parallel to the elaboration of the Guidelines. First results of the survey were collected in the 
second half of 2004. The investigation comprised both a methodological and a procedural review of the 
state-of-art of the implementation of Art 125. Besides the developed risk regulation policy, the 
questionnaire tried to shed light also on the operational “bridge” MS have created between the two 
banks of risk analysis and planning evaluation. In the last part, the questionnaire addressed also the 
matter of communication between these institutional players and civil society.  
One outcome of this survey, represented by this document, is that of “Roadmaps”. The term refers to 
the several possible “implementation routes” complying with the requirement of Article 12 and with the 
                                                 
3 “Planning” has to be understood in the sense of as defined in Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive which 
includes “classical planning” as well as all other policies to implement the requirements of this article. 
4 Refer to www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/seveso/index.htm. Note that the report doesn’t refer specifically 
to Art 12, since it was addressed on the transposition of the text of the Directive within MS legislation.  
5 In this context “methodological” refers to the technical aspects of the risk assessment approach implemented in 
MS, while and “procedural” refers to the decision-making processes – i.e actors, competences, etc - enforcing its 
outputs in land-use decisions.  
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guiding principles as laid down in the LUP Guidance document that forms the basis for the 
implementation principles. The concept of Roadmaps represents the several routes “from risk to trust” 
reflecting the interaction among plant managers, risk analysts, planners, decision-makers and 
stakeholders. It is very important to stress that the use of the plural is to underline that there are several 
options the development of this route follows, depending on national regulatory and cultural 
backgrounds. 
In the light of the transitional phase which characterises several national risk regulations, the reported 
analysis has been updated, after the first collection of questionnaires at the end of 2004, up to summer 
2007. The Roadmaps, complementary to the LUP Guidance, are therefore one of the tools the 
Commission will furnish to Member States – with particular regard to new ones - in order to have 
generally adoptable guiding principles for the matter of risk in land-use planning, as well as a 
representative overview of the national policies and experiences from which the principles have been 
derived.  
 
II. Risk in land-use planning: framing Art 12 within European environmental policies  
 
According to several scholars6, the industrialized nations entered a historical phase known as “risk 
society”, resulting from the increasing interaction between hazardous man-made activities and 
vulnerable human and environmental settlements. According to this view, risk is rewarded as an 
externality of the (western) adopted economical pattern and, consequently, as an intrinsic societal 
element. The societal response is the increased awareness about new risks: facilitated by the diffusion 
of media, terms such as risk prevention, industrial safety and, more recently, urban security, became of 
common use.  
Regardless of the lively scientific debate on the applicability of this interpretation to current societal 
patterns7, the existence, in industrialised countries, of a number of technological facilities posing some 
risks to the surrounding environment is evident. Together with the European and extra-European 
accident history of the last decades, this led to a reflection of policy-formulation. This short paragraph 
lists some of the more relevant European steps in this direction. 
Together with risks related to major accidents (some of the most recent have been the accident in 
Enschede, in The Netherlands, in 2000; and the accident in Toulouse, France, in 2001), also other kinds 
of risk are regarded as central in land-use planning. Considering a chemical accident as a sort of 
“extraordinary” impact of a given industrial activity, also so-called ordinary impacts (like emissions and 
waste production) would represent, if not carefully regulated, an environmental risk factor. The 
appropriate separation of establishments, infrastructures and residential settlements in industrial areas is 
therefore a key prevention factor, which has to be taken into account in planning policies. This interface 
is, consequently, a relevant part of European environmental regulation. The main pieces of legislation 
are reported in the following paragraphs8.  
Implicitly concerned with the location of new industrial activities, the IPPC Directive of 19969 may be 
considered as the most relevant European Directive with respect to the Seveso II Directive. Although 
the main aim of the IPPC Directive is about minimising pollution from various point sources, in Article 
3 the Directive requires “…that installations are operated in such a way that…..the necessary measures 
                                                 
6 Refer, in particular, to Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new Modernity, Sage Publications, London, 1992. 
First edition: 1986. 
7 Which have been, historically, always characterized by technological innovation and by the creation of new 
benefits coupled with risks; refer, among othersin this regard, to Leiss W., 1993. 
8 German observation over the independence of these regulations.  
9 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, 
online at  http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ippc/  
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are taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”. All installations covered by Annex I of 
the Directive are required to obtain an authorization from the authorities in EU countries and, unless 
they have a permit, they are not allowed to operate. The permits must be based on the concept of Best 
Available Techniques (or BAT), which is defined in Article 2 of the Directive. However, it should be 
pointed out that the BAT requirements make only limited reference to safety issues, as the focus of the 
Directive is on pollution. 
A second relevant Directive is the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, whose last 
amended by the Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003. 
The first version of the Directive dates from 1985. The EIA therefore has a long history, during which, 
over the last two decades, its development has been enriched, with inputs deriving from the adoption of 
the precautionary principles (1997) up to the Convention of Aarhus on the access to information and 
public participation to decision-making processes regarding environmental matters the Community 
signed in 199810. Basically, the EIA procedure aims at ensuring that the effects (= impacts) of human 
projects on the environment are identified and assessed before the authorisations to projects are given. 
The EIA Directive outlines which project categories shall be made subject to an EIA, which procedure 
shall be followed and the content of the assessments. Obviously, next to the ordinary impacts of 
industrial activities, also the extraordinary impacts represented by accidents are considered. The EIA 
requires Member States to conduct case-by-case assessments procedures and/or to adopt thresholds and 
criteria for the quantification of consequences. One of the selection criteria for projects must be, in this 
sense, “[…] the risk of accidents, having regard in particular to substances or technologies used” 
(selection criteria 1 referred to Art 2); moreover, the location of projects must be assessed having regard 
to “[…] The environmental sensitivity of geographical areas likely to be affected by projects, having 
regard, in particular, to: — the existing land use, — the  relative abundance, quality and regenerative 
capacity of natural resources in the area, — the absorption capacity of the natural environment” 
(selection criterion 2 referred to Art 4). Finally, the characteristics of the effects must be considered 
having regard, in particular, to “[…] — the extent of the impact (geographical area and size of the 
affected population), — the transfrontier nature of the impact, — the magnitude and complexity of the 
impact, — the probability of the impact, — the duration, frequency and reversibility of the impact” 
(selection criterion 3 referred to Art 4). In several countries, the evident overlap between the Seveso II 
and EIA procedures led to bringing the two regulations together; the documentation required for 
licensing procedures can be elaborated once. This synergy is precious in terms of timing and 
transparency of the licensing as well as for the safety management of plants.  
A third relevant environmental EU Directive considering the risk as central for land-use planning 
purposes is the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)11. Its aim is to ensure that environmental 
consequences of certain plans and programmes are identified and assessed during their preparation and 
before their adoption. The Directive promotes the assessment of the effects on the environment and on 
human health deriving from the adoption of certain plans and projects in a long-term, inter-generational 
perspective. A criterion for determining the likely significance of effects referred to in Article 3(5) is 
the preventive assessment of “[…] the probability, duration, frequency and reversibility of the effects; 
the cumulative nature of the effects; the transboundary nature of the effects;  the risks to human health 
or the environment (e.g. due to accidents); the magnitude and spatial extent of the effects (geographical 
area and size of the population likely to be affected); the value and vulnerability of the area likely to be 
affected due to: - special natural characteristics or cultural heritage, - exceeded environmental quality 
                                                 
10 The complete text of the EIA Directive (85/337/EEC and successive versions) can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/eia/eia-legalcontext.htm; the text and the comments on the UNECE 
Convention of Aarhus can be consulted at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/.  
11 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain plans & programmes on the environment, Journal of the European Community 21.7.2001, refer 
to: http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/eia/sea-support.htm  
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standards or limit values, - intensive land-use; the effects on areas or landscapes which have a 
recognised national, Community or international protection status”. Also here, the typical terminology 
of risk assessment works as a sub-text. As in the case of the Seveso II Directive, criteria and indicators 
for risk estimation are to be defined by Member States. This relevant presence of the theme of risk in 
the SEA led, in some national contexts, to an explicit reference to “technological risks” as a main 
environmental SEA field-of-action12.  
Finally, a background role refers to the European Spatial Planning Development Perspective (ESPD) 
adopted in Potsdam on 10-11 May 1999. The joint document defines the objectives of EU spatial 
development policy as ‘[…] to work towards a balanced and sustainable development of the territory of 
the European Union. In the Ministers' view, what is important is to ensure that the three fundamental 
goals of European policy are achieved equally in all the regions of the EU: 1) economic and social 
cohesion; 2) conservation and management of natural resources; 3) the cultural heritage and 4) more 
balanced competitiveness of the European territory”13.Although the document explicitly refers to 
natural rather than technological disasters, the topic of risk of soil erosion due to land-uses and of the 
contamination of soil/water by pollutants is generally considered; “risk factors” are also considered as 
those deriving from human as well as natural pressures. In this respect, the document stresses how “[…] 
Knowledge about different risk factors is still insufficient and requires the development of sophisticated 
methodologies based on a comprehensive concept of risk evaluation” and recommends, among its 
policy options, the “[…] Development of integrated strategies for the protection of cultural heritage 
which is endangered or decaying, including the development of instruments for assessing risk factors 
and for managing critical situations”. 
 
III. Requirements of Art 12 Seveso II  
 
The relevant part of the text of Article 12 Seveso II reads as follows: 
”Member States shall ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the 
consequences of such accidents are taken into account in their land-use policies and/or other relevant 
policies. They shall pursue those objectives through controls on: 
(a) the siting of new establishments, 
(b) modifications to existing establishments covered by Article 10, 
(c) new developments such as transport links, locations frequented by the public and residential areas 
in the vicinity of existing establishments, where the siting or developments are such as to increase the 
risk or consequences of a major accident. 
Member States shall ensure that their land-use and/or other relevant policies and the procedures for 
implementing those policies take account of the need, in the long term, to maintain appropriate 
distances between establishments covered by this Directive and residential areas, buildings and areas 
of public use, major transport routes as far as possible, recreational areas and areas of particular 
                                                 
12 This was, inter alia, suggested in the publication of the Italian Ministry of Environment “Linee Guida per la 
Valutazione Ambientale Strategica (VAS) – Fondi Strutturali 2000-2006”, L’ambiente Informa n. 9., 1999. 12 
Refer, for example, to the Italian Guidelines on the implementation of the SEA procedure, Italian Ministry of 
Environment, 1999. 
13 European Spatial Development Perspective – Towards balanced and sustainable development of the territory 
of the European Union, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999 ISBN 
92-828-7658-6. Refer to: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/pdf/sum_en.pdf  
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natural sensitivity or interest and, in the case of existing establishments, of the need for additional 
technical measures in accordance with Article 5 so as not to increase the risks to people.” 
 
The interpretation and explanation of the requirements are given in the LUP Guidance. The Guidance 
furthermore defines general and supporting principles for compliance with the Article. In the context of 
the “roadmaps” this is the basis for the development of more detailed procedural and structural 
provisions. Reference to the Seveso II LUP principles follows in the chapters on overall 
recommendations. Below are defined some terms frequently used in this document. For the LUP 
Guidance a “EWGLUP Glossary”14 was issued being a complementary part of the LUP Guidance; 
terms included there are not listed below: 
1. Land15 
Land is defined as the surface of the solid Earth, together with superficial vegetation cover, built 
features and associated water surfaces, both freshwater and marine. 
2. Land Use16 
Land Use describes the land surface from the social perspective; it is characterised by some identifiable 
purpose, or purposes, in using it to produce or achieve tangible or intangible products or benefits. 
3. Planning 
Planning is the exercise of foresight, systematically examining alternative proposals for action to attain 
specific goals and objectives. It includes the description of the desired future state of affairs and of the 
actions needed to bring about this state. 
4. Land Use Planning (in general)17 
The systematic assessment of land and water potential, alternative patterns of land use and other 
physical, social and economic conditions, for the purpose of selecting and adopting land-use options 
that are most beneficial to land users without degrading the resources or the environment, together with 
the selection of measures most likely to encourage such land uses. Land-use planning may be at 
international, national, district or local levels. It includes participation by land users, planners and 
decision-makers and covers educational, legal, fiscal and financial measures. 
5. Land Use Planning (specifically in the Seveso II context) 
A range of activities from procedures to administrative or governmental provisions to accomplish a 
steering of the allocation of land use with the aim to achieve a zoning for the land around a Seveso 
establishments that complies with the requirements of Article 12. 
6. Zoning 
In the context of land use planning, it is a term that indicates the regulation of the uses of land by 
defining certain categories of homogenous (allowed) development within assigned areas, resulting in 
“zones”. 
IV. Content and purpose of the initial LUP questionnaire 
 
The MAHB LUP - questionnaire was divided in three parts. Part A, concerning the methodology for 
LUP in place, comprised 17 questions ranging from the description of the risk assessment procedure to 
                                                 
14 Refer to http://landuseplanning.jrc.it 
15 EEA Glossary 
16 Own definition, which summarizes the one proposed by the EEA Glossary.  
17 FAO Glossary 
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the endpoints values in use. Part B concerned the implementation of Art 12 and the legal and procedural 
instruments enforcing its requirements in all the cases covered by Seveso II. Part C, in which MS were 
invited to express their opinion concerning the properties of “good practice”, was divided in 2 
questions18.  
The Major Hazard Accident Bureau collected the results up until the end of 200419. Cumulative tables, 
whose scope was presenting a rapid overview of the different implementation of the Seveso II in the 
Union, were elaborated. At the time that the questionnaire was sent out, the LUP - Guidance was under 
parallel development and not yet accepted by the representatives of the Member States. The 
questionnaire therefore could not reflect the Guidance contents, but it summarised the status of the 
discussions at on the working level at that time. In the following months, results were updated 
accordingly to the developments of the Guidelines. EWGLUP members (particularly from the countries 
selected for further investigation) were periodically invited to revise them. The main points of interest 
with respect to the development of “roadmaps” were:  
1. the way the “appropriateness” and the “risk level” are determined (i.e. RA methodology), and 
2. the way the technical advice deriving from risk analysis is converted in planning measures20. 
Both aspects were considered relevant to understand the methodological, decisional and spatial 
dimensions of national practices. The results showed a significant divergence with respect to the 
methods and approaches in use or the key decision elements. On the other hand, it was possible to spot 
at least some common fundamentals in those cases where the MAHB received a response. It then was 
decided to make a second, more in-depth survey for five of the most significant cases of practices of 
Member States, namely for 
- the Netherlands 
- France 
- Italy 
- Germany and 
- the United Kingdom. 
For these five examples the information provided was extended on the basis of bilateral contacts. The 
result is given in annex… of this document. So all in all the sources for the definition of “roadmaps” for 
the implementation of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive are the following: 
- the original LUP questionnaire 
- the detailed five national examples (UK, D, IT, F, NL) 
- information received within the EWGLUP and related activities, e.g. seminars and workshops 
such as Lille 2001, Luxemburg 2005, Graz 2005 and Strasbourg 2006 
- personal input of the authors, who coordinated the investigation, elaborated the document and 
updated its content by mean of periodic consultations with the EGLUP members. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The original questionnaire is reported in Annex II. 
19The French Questionnaire has been collected at the beginning of 2005, while in case of the information from 
The Netherlands the design of the Roadmap has been supported by VROM - Dutch Ministry of Spatial Planning 
& Environment in the period comprised between March and April 2005.  
20 For further information concerning the questionnaire and the evaluation of the results, please consult the 
EWGLUP – Webpage, http://landuseplanning.jrc.it  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ROADMAPS 
 
I. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICY OPTIONS 
 
This document is based on the description of selected national procedures complying with the Article 
12 requirements of the Seveso II Directive. Procedures are selected on the base of their exemplification 
of different methods and so-called “decisional routes” fulfilling Art 12. Based on the assumption that 
the adoption of a methodological approach to land-use planning in risky areas represents a policy-
formulation operation, a brief overview of the most recent theoretical development in this disciplinary 
field is given in the following.  
A fundamental ethical principle underlying policy-formulation processes in democratic countries is that 
of “justice”. From the (economic) utilitarian perspective, the operational translation of ‘justice’ 
corresponds to the maximization of the collective “utility”21. The approach to decision stemming from 
this equation is that of utilitarianism, which basic assumption is that, to satisfy a pre-defined objective, 
the rational behaviour opts for the best alternative among a set of given alternatives22. The “right” 
policy is therefore the one opting for the alternative maximizing the collective utility. Related 
objectives usually reflect the axiom of “public interest”, as decision-makers are expected to act as a 
regulatory body whose power is hierarchically superior to private interests.  
In recent years, thanks to further contributions of economical and cognitive sciences, the rational-based 
approach to policy-making has been enriched until the development of proper alternative models. One 
of interest for the purposes of the present work and relevant to territorial policies is the so-called 
advocacy planning23 or the pluralist planning24. Although complementary to the rational model - the 
bounded rationality is accepted in principle – this planning theory is based on a more complex 
representation of the reality, and focuses on one key-aspect of policy-making: the distribution of power. 
In “practical” decisional scenarios in fact, power and liabilities are not equally distributed and policy 
making is influenced by different interests and values at the stake. Hence, policy options should reflect 
a “negotiation” activity and policy-makers should focus on the equal representation of each actor’s 
expectations, rather than promoting a solution unilaterally. Notably, in advocacy planning processes 
there is no a mathematically-generated “best option”: the adopted option represents the balance among 
different interests, or the alternative that, in a given context and in a given time, is considered as the 
representative solution.  
It is very interesting to reflect on what it means, in operational terms, adapting one of these two briefly 
described approaches within the land-use planning in risky areas field25. When allocating a land portion 
for the edification of a plant, or edifying settlements closed to an existing one, the decisional scenario is 
                                                 
21 The proposition is very general and has to be intended as a broad introduction to the main concepts underlying 
policy-making theories.  
22 The criteria to judge the ‘best’ among a set of alternatives are obviously crucial and object of continue 
investigation from the side of social sciences, particularly within the field of decision science. An interesting study 
in this domain is in Keeney, R.L (2004), “Framing Public Policy Decisions”, Int. J. Technology, Policy and 
Management, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp 95-115.  
23 Davidoff P., “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning”, Journal of the American Institute of Planners,1962; 
24 Peattie L.R, “Reflections on Advocacy Planning”, Journal of the American Institute of Planning, 1968; Hague 
C., “Reflections on Community Planning”, in Critical Reading in Planning Theory, Pergamon Press, Oxford 
1982. 
25 The two examples are hypothetical applications of the two different approaches and are not referring to any real 
case known to the Authors.   
 12
the same for both decision-makers. The objective of safety is the primary goal of decisions, but 
variables are evidently characterized by uncertainty: the maximization of safety by means of unlimited 
distances of establishments from urban/environmental areas is not achievable due to unsustainable 
economical repercussions. Hence, policy-makers have “bounded” rationality and limited elements 
supporting their choice. Also, they have different roles in terms of liability and powers. Theoretically a 
pure rational policy maker will focus on the primary goal of decision26 and he will equip himself with a 
model or tool capable to elaborate the data at his disposal. His approach is generating a set of 
alternatives, on the basis of quantitative data, and selecting the one maximizing its objective. The 
second decision-maker instead will accept that the ideal choice is a-priori unachievable, and will 
consider the set of possibilities as limited by the effective distribution of interests, liabilities, capacities 
and powers of the involved actors. His approach is concerting stakes and powers involved in the case 
and opening to a negotiation process which best represents the actors’ interests (for example, even if 
acceptable external safety is achievable, he could decide to represent the will of placing the plant in a 
different context, or to compensate citizens with additional interventions).  
It may be observed that while the first approach is based on an idealistic representation of the reality 
and on a positive perception of the role of science in resolving public-domain problems, the second opts 
for a contextual and historical-determined representation of problems. In the first case, the “neutrality” 
of scientific responses is regarded as the fair ground of decisions; in the second case, they are accounted 
but do not necessarily match the best political alternative.  
Significantly, these two approaches are very useful for the interpretation of the developments of the 
European risk regulation. In the last two decades, proper ‘school of thoughts’ emerged and promoted a 
lively debate over different approaches to risk governance, which is increasingly regarded as an 
autonomous policy field. The engineering-dominated and the psychometric approaches are the two 
most confronted views. The first responds to the rational model discussed above; the second “imports” 
into the concept and the analysis of risks also societal elements. The perception of risks from the side of 
involved parties in given contexts is the most accounted27. Therefore, the discrepancy between the two 
views lies in the approach to the very concept of risk (and, but not implicitly, of uncertainty)28 and its 
operational translation into relevant governance approaches29. Although a complete dissertation over 
the differences among the two visions is not among the purposes of the present work, it is important to 
stress that their integration into a more comprehensive, integrated approach to risk governance is the 
                                                 
26 This corresponds, in this context, to the maximum achievable distance between accident scenarios and targets.  
27 Among the social scientist who stressed the importance of extending the characterization of risks up to the 
inclusion of their perception from the side of involved actors, Slovic P. in particular demonstrated how, for 
example, people perceive nuclear power more risky than other activities and technologies and are consequently 
less willing to accept it. As in many other cases, its perception appears not influenced by the statistic mortality 
ranking, which estimates nuclear power as dramatically less risky than car driving. Hence, stakeholders act and 
choose on the base of their perceptions more than scientific data. Refer to Slovic. P, Flynn, J., Mertz C.K, 
Poumadere M and Mays C (2000), “Nuclear Power and the Public: a Comparative Study of risk perception in 
France and the United States”, in Renn. O and Rohrmann B (eds), Cross-cultural risk perception – a survey of 
empirical studies, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publisher.  
28 In ordinary language the two terms are often associated. In the economical (most accepted) definition they 
represent instead rather different concepts: risk is quantifiable item which can be expressed in terms of a 
probability distribution, while uncertainty refers to unknown and unpredictable scenarios.  Refer to Knight, F.H 
(1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 216-217. Reported in Arcuri A., 
2005, Governing the risk of ultra-hazardous activities. Challenge for Contemporary Legal  
29 The implications of the several type of uncertainties in the formulation of governance approaches are discussed 
in De Marchi B., Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J. (1996): Seveso: A paradoxical classical disaster, in Mitchell, J.K 
(ed.)  The long road to recovery: community responses to industrial disaster, Tokyo, United Nation University 
Press.    
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centre of interest of most of current European research30. Bridging the famous “gap”31 between the 
engineering-dominated view and the social science perspective through the integration of both 
contributions in policy-formulation processes appears to be, in fact, the current frontier of risk 
governance studies32. A particularly valuable contribution, which concludes this general overview, is 
the following: 
“Risk management implies a choice among alternatives in the presence of uncertainties. Indeed the 
results of predictive models and expert judgements are uncertain, especially when they refer to 
phenomena verifiable only in the long term (e.g. nuclear waste disposal, global climate change and its 
effects, etc.). The different values, knowledge and interests of the parties involved with respect to 
expected costs and benefits, parameters to be considered and equity of proposed deliberations 
represent the second difficult issue. […] recent changes in the paradigms for risk analysis and 
management show examples of participatory procedures developed for facilitating adoption and 
implementation of informed decisions, which appear to be promising for achieving consensus at least 
as far as local and/or national decision making is concerned. [These processes] aimed at the 
“characterization” of risks through the involvement of different parties and interests in the early stage 
of the problem-solving, before any formalization of the risk itself. This is not aimed at a reduction of the 
role of the scientific modelling, but at the elicitation of the values and the perspectives of the involved 
communities in order to integrate them as part of the analysis and in order to build a mutual trust 
among the different parties” 33. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Refer, among others, to the European project Risk Bridge –Building Robust, Integrative, inter-disciplinary 
governance models for emerging and existing risks. The project, coordinated by the National Applied Research 
Institute TNO (NL) covers 6 risk domains and involves 5 European partners. Online www.riskbridge.eu  
31 Refer to Horlick-Jones T. (1998), “Meaning and contextualisation in risk assessment”, Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety n.59, pp.79-89. 
32 In this respect, a first distinction among different risk domains in terms of their effective probabilistic or 
uncertain nature appears to be necessary to adjust the contributions of quantitative and qualitative analysis within 
decision-making processes. Refer to Renn O. and Graham P. (eds.), Risk Governance – Towards an Integrative 
Approach, White Paper n.1, International Risk Governance Council, 2005, Geneva. 
33 Amendola A., Gestione dei rischi: dai rischi globali a quelli locali, Quaderni CRASL, 2002, Italy. 
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II. WHY “ROADMAPS”?  
 
In the previous chapter the theoretical framework for policy options was described. Within this 
framework several practical implementation routes a possible or have been developed by various 
countries. The requirement of Article 12 Seveso II represents a very specific obligation for a planning 
procedure lively34. As is well known, the PP states that if the potential consequences of an action are 
severe or irreversible, in the absence of full scientific certainty the burden of proof falls on those who 
would advocate taking the action. Recognizing the differing interpretations of the concept of “full 
scientific certainty” of outstanding evidence, together with the issue of the incomplete reliability of 
most of proof stemming from uncertain data, the problem of finding a univocal adaptation of the PP to 
risk prevention arises. It is not within the purpose of this document to address a discussion about the 
operational relevance of the PP within this domain; yet it has to be underlined that its relevance in terms 
of approach to the problem of LUP should be considered. In this context in fact a proper safety 
distances are a risk tolerability criterion and consequent LUP is a prevention measure minimizing the 
consequences of accidents. The evaluation of safety distances should, in this respect, opt for the most 
precautionary measure and LUP should extend the horizon of its validity to the long-term period. 
Methods and approaches are discussed in the remainder of the document. 
The scope of the Roadmaps is to describe different ‘decisional routes’ bridging the risk analysis to land-
use planning as required by Article 12 of Seveso II. Implicitly the assessment of risks and the risk 
reduction measures taken with land-use planning policies are accounted. Hence, they have a twofold 
nature: on the one hand, they report methodological differences of the analyzed practices and, on the 
other hand, they describe different procedural routes; all those being related to different national 
contexts. These different national contexts may have a number of factors to be relevant for each 
member state, as reported in the table below. 
COUNTRY/REGIONAL 
VARIABLES  
Quantitative variables Qualitative variables 
GEOGRAPHICAL/ 
DEMOGRAPHICAL  
Territorial morphology; 
Population density. 
Territorial specificities (particular 
agricultural production, water sources, 
etc);  Environmental specificities (rare 
flora/fauna) 
 
ECONOMICAL 
Nr. of Seveso II Plants;  
National/regional economical 
capacity (i.e. risk reduction/ 
additional measures availability); 
Relevance of the chemical industry 
within national economical system and 
history. 
LEGAL  Additional national legal  
provisions 
Legal system (common law vs. civil 
law). 
SOCIETAL  Local communities composition 
(percentage of elderly, young 
families, working force, etc) 
Local communities’ risk perception 
(deriving from accident history, 
cultural specificities, etc); 
Environmental protection culture.  
TAB 1 Example of quantitative and qualitative variables influencing European national “Roadmaps”. 
 
 
                                                 
34 An interesting study about the feasibility and the application of the precautionary principle in the risk 
prevention domain (applied to the avian flue threat) is in Basili M. and Franzini M. (2005), The Avian Flu 
Disease: a Case of Precautionary Failure. Quaderni n. 454, Universita’ degli studi di Siena (eds.), Dipartimento di 
Economia Politica, Siena. 
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Nevertheless the survey of current practices has shown that all systems at least comprise five common 
elements, namely: 
 
- reference scenarios for the calculation of effects 
- occurrence estimates for events of concern (e. g. frequency of “loss of containment”) 
- target vulnerability indicators (e.g. effect endpoints) 
- separation distances and  
- technical measures to replace separation distances with respect to certain principles (feasibility, 
proportionality etc.) 
 
Consequently concepts of risk assessment and resulting in land-use planning contain: 
 
- hazard/risk assessment methods (sometimes, in the same country, more than one); 
- selection of reference scenarios (i.e. selection based on history, substance, worse or most 
credible scenarios, etc); 
- the definition of tolerability thresholds (i.e. qualitative limits and/or endpoints); 
-  the classification of territorial, urban and environmental targets (i.e. transportation route, 
buildings, natural elements); 
- the outcome of the whole procedure in the form of a restriction of land uses (“zoning”) or in the 
form of technical solutions (“additional technical measures”). 
 
This configuration leads to a triangle of interdependence among different phases, whose connections 
are related to specific actors’ responsibilities (safety authority, planning authority, 
administrative/governmental level): 
 
 
FIG 1: Safety, Planning and governance feedbacks in risk management 
  
Each element of the triangle is described in the following. If reference is made to individual methods or 
examples this shall not be regarded as a recommendation but has entirely demonstrative character. 
 
Hazard/Risk Assessment & 
Scenario Selection 
Zoning/ allowed 
developments 
Tolerability 
thresholds/targets 
classification 
 
Risk Assessment 
in Land Use 
Planning 
 
governance 
feedback 
safety 
feedback  
planning 
feedback 
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III. HAZARD/ RISK ASSESSMENT & SCENARIO SELECTION 
1. Hazard/risk assessment method selection: a step-by-step decision 
The adoption of a concept for risk analysis in land-use planning comprises two basic decisions about: 
- the general category of approaches (deterministic vs. probabilistic);  
- the risk assessment method adopted within the category,  
being the distinction between “approach” and “method” used in the context of this document: 
- “approach”: the adopted definition of “risk” and to the way risk is evaluated and compared  with 
a measuring scale; 
- “method”: the models of hazard identification and assessment compatible with the approach. 
As defined in several comparative studies and EU surveys35, the options for hazard/risk assessment 
approaches are divided in two categories with a sub-category each. The main difference between the 
two categories refers to the consideration of the frequencies of accident events as a factor to be 
accounted within the following evaluations:  
a) “risk-oriented”/quantitative approach 
b) “risk-oriented”/semi-quantitative approach (limiting pre-conditions are defined)  
c) “consequence-oriented”/effects based approach, with implicit consideration of frequencies 
d) “consequence-oriented”/general distances approach (use of tables of fixed distances). 
It shall be underlined that risk analysis for LUP must be regarded as a specific form of other approaches 
of that kind where development is still in progress and there exist no standardized options so far. 
The options in general are briefly described in the following. 
Basically, and as a general explanation for the following descriptions, the distinction between 
probabilistic and deterministic approach lies in the way how assumptions are made to cope with a real 
situation. Whereas the probabilistic approach seeks to picture the real situation as much as possible in a 
more dynamic form, the deterministic approach depicts a homogenous situation which “covers” all 
deviations (thus adding a safety factor to the statistic results). Hereby the probabilistic approach is the 
more ambitious one which requires mostly more data input and related efforts (see picture below as 
example).  
 
 
 
 
FIG 2: Approach Characteristics 
                                                 
35 Refer, among others, to Christou D. M, Amendola A., Smeder M. (2000) “The control of major accidents 
hazards: the land-use planning issue”, appeared in the Journal of Hazardous Materials devoted to the Seveso II 
Directive; to Cozzani V., Bandini, C. Basta, M. Christou (2006), Application of land-use planning criteria for the 
control of major accident hazards: a case-study, J. Hazard. Mater. 136 170–180ence…..  
RED: Probabilistic Assumption 
BLUE : Real Values 
Deterministic Assumption
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a) Risk-oriented (or risk-based) quantitative approach 
The “risk oriented” quantitative approach is characterized by a final decision based on a numerical risk 
figure. For reasons of practicability the form of a single figure is preferred, although a strictly 
mathematical calculation would require a measure of uncertainty (variance) of the final number. The 
underlying approach is probabilistic, i.e. based on a definition of risk as a numerical definition of 
effects and frequencies of accident events. In this kind of approach, essential steps of the decision-
making are listed in the following: 
 The fundamental decision to perform a risk-oriented method must be followed by the 
conclusion either to use a “full probabilistic” method or a probabilistic method with certain pre-
selected assumptions (the “full probabilistic” requiring a huge amount of data and preparation 
which may not be justified and is thus relatively rare).  
 In the latter case the decision must comprise and define the limiting conditions of the pre-
selection 
 The next decision step concerns the exact methodology of the chosen options 
 The “risk-oriented quantitative approach” then requires the availability of reliable and/or agreed 
failure frequency data 
 Depending on the hazard assessment methodology decision a set of scenarios has to be defined  
 The scenarios are the source for a modelling of consequences 
 For the modelling relevant population and environmental data are required 
 The consequence assessment requires effect endpoints 
 The final result is expressed in numerical risk values and compared with predetermined risk 
figures which are set by the responsible authority 
 The status of the endpoints and the risk values must be clarified 
 
b) Semi-quantitative approach 
 
The semi-quantitative approach splits the main elements (likelihood of occurrence, consequences) into 
two different options of description, qualitative or quantitative. The first assessment result is a list of 
pre-selected scenarios (a “full-probabilistic” part usually is not carried out in this approach). The risk-
oriented part, if quantitative, requires a database for failure frequencies or consequences in numerical 
terms. The assessment outcome may be expressed in the form of an effect calculation. This may entail 
also the necessary input of population and environmental data and the decision on the status of the 
effect endpoints. The other form of measure could be a qualitative one for the severity of the 
consequences, thus combining a quantitative occurrence axis with a qualitative consequence measure.   
Besides the splitting up in the first step of the decision scheme the requirements are the same as in the 
case of the other methods. 
 
c) and d) Consequence-oriented / fixed distances approach 
 
The “fixed distances” comprise a subcategory of the “consequence-based” approach, so they are 
described together. Differing from the probabilistic case, the consequence-oriented approach requires a 
limited number of decisions. First of all, a different definition of risk underlines the assessment, i.e. 
“risk” comparable with the concept of “danger”: the evaluation of frequencies of events is not explicit, 
i.e. is not a numerical factor but an orienting criterion for the selection of scenarios. Step-by-step 
decisions for the adoption of this approach are, consequently:  
 at first, the definition of pre-selected scenarios and the underlying conditions for the pre-
selection (usually, a qualitative likelihood determination based on historical failures, best 
practice prevention, control and mitigation measures  or a purely conventional one); 
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 based on these scenarios, a modelling of consequences, for which 
 the definition of agreed effect endpoints, i.e. a “tolerability” threshold, is necessary; 
 the status of the endpoints target or legally binding- must be also defined 
 the measure for the tolerability of the calculated consequences/effects could be a qualitative 
severity ranking or a comparison with threshold figures.  
 For the “fixed distance” approach, the concept is broadly similar and comprises a preliminary 
step on the categories of application and a conclusion on the status of the generic distances 
calculated by the categorized consequence assessment. 
 
2. Linking risk analysis and LUP: overview of methods and underlying concepts 
 
Usually, the risk analysis carried out for LUP purposes is linked with the one carried out for plant 
safety. Thus, identified safety-relevant scenarios are also used for specific LUP purposes, or there is a 
connection between the two stages (i.e. the data provided in the safety report/studies are the same as 
those used by planning/environmental authorities to assess the compatibility of land-use decisions). 
Concerning the LUP activity, depending on the complexity of the case and on the available resources, 
opting for a qualitative or a quantitative approach results in a relevant difference in terms of procedures 
and necessary information; as a result the complexity of the assessment differs.  In this regard, it should 
be stressed that, in the majority of analyzed cases, the authorities responsible for the implementation of 
the LUP requirements of the Seveso II are mostly planners and municipalities’ officials. One of the 
often mentioned “gaps” therefore consists of the difficulty to translate, for instance, the “boundary” of a 
given effect area with a certain frequency into a geographical land-use limitation, since the two 
assessments are carried out by different responsible persons.  It can be easily observed that the 
engineering-dominated side of risk analysts may find difficulty in communicating the more social and 
political mentality of planners, and vice versa36. Here, besides two different disciplinary domains, also 
the related professional mentalities are confronted: it can be easily observed that the engineering-
dominated side of risk analysts may find difficult to dialogue with the more social and political 
dominated side of planners, and vice versa.  
However, an efficient cooperation between the two sectors is necessary.  
One of the crucial elements which would assist facilitating their dialogue is the creation of a common 
terminology, resolving the problem of misuses of terms This means gaining agreement on decision 
processes should take place in advance. One typical example of the variety of terms which are used as 
equivalent although a rigorous distinction exists is: 
 
• hazard identification,  
• hazard evaluation,  
• risk analysis,  
• risk assessment, etc. 
 
The identification of the specific hazard, which is completed with the evaluation of the magnitude of a 
set of scenarios, is the preliminary step of every risk reduction strategy.  
The CCPS37 guidelines list 12 types of hazard evaluation methods: 
 
- Safety Review 
- Checklists 
                                                 
36 Jones. H-J. (1998) “Meaning and contextualization in risk assessment” Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety 59 (1998) 79-89. 
37 Center for Chemical Process Safety (1999), Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis 2nd 
Edition, Wiley Publisher. 
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- Relative Ranking (Dow Index, Substance Hazard Index, etc.) 
- Preliminary Hazard Analysis (sometimes also Preliminary Consequence Analysis) 
- What – If Analysis 
- What – If & Checklist Analysis 
- Hazard & Operability Analysis 
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
- Fault Tree Analysis 
- Event Tree Analysis 
- Cause – Consequence Analysis 
- Human Reliability Analysis 
 
Two other well-acknowledged methods are: 
a) the “Layer of Protection Analysis”-method (LOPA) a simplified form of quantified analysis 
which lies in rigorousness between HAZOP and the more quantitative forms of fault & event 
tree and 
b) ARAMIS38, which combines various well-proven elements of other methods 
 
It is out of the intended scope of this document to describe the methods in more detail, but it is 
important to mention that the direct applicability of these methods for LUP purposes is not always 
feasible. The agreed principles for compliance of Article 12 recommend the use of reference scenarios. 
On the other hand, some of the hazard assessment methods are entirely aimed at hazard identification 
and it is not possible to derive directly accident scenarios to be used for LUP. In some other cases, the 
number of scenarios used for the method may be much higher than required for LUP risk assessment. 
Expert judgment will normally be the option to derive scenarios from the plant safety risk analysis. 
 
3. Scenario Selection 
 
The LUP Guidance recommends the use of reference scenarios for the purpose of land-use planning in 
the context of Seveso II. As already explained in the last chapter, there is a coherent link between risk 
analysis used for plant safety and the one for LUP. Nevertheless is must be pointed out that some 
differences need to be considered. Reasons for that might be: 
 
- The LUP Guidance recommends a ranking of scenarios: those of greater likelihood shall be 
taken for plant safety, those of lower likelihood for LUP and those with the lowest (thus those 
with the most severe consequences) for emergency planning 
- Risk analysis for LUP is – in comparison with plant safety judgment – will require a broader 
form of  assessment as the process does not demand results with very high reliability (e.g. it 
would be impossible to envisage distances which indicate exact “borders of harm”) 
- In some cases technical details of the establishment of concern will not be known (e. g. planned 
modifications that need to be taken into account for the predicted effects on the surrounding 
area) 
 
It would be costly and probably over-ambitious to suggest an assessment based on a large number of 
scenarios, therefore the more feasible way is to use a small number of representative ones. It is up to 
the individual MS to enhance the assessment to a more precise form, but from the experience seen so 
far a limited number of scenarios is sufficient.  
 
 
                                                 
38 Refer to http://aramis.jrc.it  
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In the LUP Principles Guidance a “scenario” to be used for LUP risk analysis is defined by: 
 
Scenario = “Top Event” (usually/mostly Loss of Containment) & Dangerous Phenomenon (fire, 
explosion, toxic cloud) 
 
This definition means that two elements generally analyzed separately are merged in order to simplify 
the assessment. 
Scenarios for LUP derived from the classical bow-tie model are instead reported in the following  
 
 
C r ic ita l
E v e n t
(e x  L O C )
In itia tin g  E v e n t 1
(E x  C o rro s io n )
In itia tin g  E v e n t 2
(E x  Im p a c t)
In itia tin g  E v e n t 3
(E x  H ig h  T e m p .)
A c c id e n t  1
(e x . F ir e )
A c c id e n t  2
(e x . E x p lo s io n )
F a u lt tre e E v e n t tre e
1st accident scenario
2nd accident scenario
 
FIG 3 Scenario for LUP derived from “Bow-Tie” 
 
Typical scenario examples therefore could be: 
- catastrophic vessel failure & VCE (vapour cloud explosion, see below) 
- hole in vessel wall & pool fire (ignition of released flammable liquid, see below) 
- pipe leak & toxic release etc.  
 
The Loss-of-Containment part of the scenario may be grouped into the following form: 
• vessel rupture 
• vessel leak 
• vessel roof collapse 
• pipe rupture 
• pipe leak 
• loading connection release (leak or rupture) 
 
The “dangerous phenomena” may be grouped as follows: 
 
- pool fire 
- tank fire 
- fireball 
- vapour cloud explosion 
- flashfire 
- jetfire 
- toxic or flammable cloud release. 
Scenario for LUP derived from classical  
“BOW-Tie” 
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The characteristics of these scenarios are:  
 
Poolfire: the combustion (ignition) of a layer of liquid (a pool) formed after the failure of the 
containment of the substance; the effect is a thermal radiation front. 
 
Tankfire: the ignition of the gaseous phase in a vessel containing a flammable liquid inside the vessel 
walls; the effect is again a thermal radiation front. 
 
Fireball: a fireball occurs when a vessel containing a flammable substance fails catastrophically after 
being superheated; it may concern pressurized liquefied gas or pressurized liquid. The consequences are 
twofold: first there is a blast effect because of the vapour expansion, and then the air-substance mixture 
ignites immediately and produces a rapidly moving flamefront. This phenomenon is often called 
BLEVE (acronym for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion). 
 
Vapour Cloud Explosion and Flashfire: The leakage of the containment of a flammable substance may 
lead to a gaseous release and the formation of a cloud which ignites if the concentration is within the 
flammability limits; depending on the speed of the resulting flame-front the phenomenon is called 
Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) or Flashfire. The first additionally causes a pressure wave. 
 
Jetfire: the leakage of a vessel containing a flammable liquid or gas can lead to a jet flame with high 
radiant energy (greater intensity than for  pool fires). 
 
Cloud Release: the release of any substance of concern with different properties, toxic or flammable; 
the effect of the formed cloud mixed and spread in the ambient air depends on these properties, the 
weather conditions, topography and in the case of flammable materials, the presence of ignition 
sources. 
 
Precondition of the scenarios relevant for LUP is a massive release of a hazardous substance (the self-
decomposition of solids is an exceptional case and is not treated in detail) due to a loss of containment 
(= leakage) and a subsequent dangerous phenomenon. The properties of the substance lead to one of the 
scenarios described: 
 
- A toxic substance, especially with higher vapour pressure, forms a cloud with mainly hazards by 
inhalation or dermal intake, in some cases also oral intake 
- A flammable substance forms a pool and from there a cloud or directly a cloud; both (cloud and 
pool) may develop to a scenario with thermal and pressure hazards in case of ignition 
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FIG 4 Interface of various types of scenarios 
One decisive element of the process is the approach how the scenario is selected, basically offering a 
a) quantitative or 
b) qualitative alternative. 
 
a) Quantitative Decision 
 
If the decision about LUP measures is made on the base of the quantitative calculation of risks, 
sufficient data about the likelihood of plant’ system failures are necessary. The frequency data may 
refer to the so-called “top event” (e. g. LOC – Loss of Containment) or to the causes (or “initiating 
events”) for this top event or to the performance of any preventive measures or barriers. These may be 
obtained  
 
- (preferably) from the establishment (operator’s) validated records,  
- on the basis of frequencies of causes in a fault tree analysis or 
- from literature in the form of generic values (default option). 
 
Despite the fact that specific data referring to the individual case is always the most favourable option, 
generic data are widely used in order to avoid extensive investigation, which regards also the accuracy 
of result. Internationally recognized references for these values, with a particular relevance to land use 
planning, are:  
 
Ignition 
Toxic Cloud 
Poolfire 
Flashfire 
Jetfire 
Fireball 
VCE 
Massive Release 
POOL CLOUD 
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o the Dutch “Purple Book”39 
o the FRED database of the HSE40 
o the “Taylor-Study” done under the authority of RIVM41 
o the “AMINAL-Study”42. 
 
These sources usually provide LOC – frequency occurrence values; some bibliographic surveys43 tried 
to compile the existing values and put them into a coherent form; one of the examples is shown below  
 
Proposition for pipe failure frequencies (occurrence per meter and year) 
 
Small leak 
(effective diameter 
of 10% of the 
nominal diameter) 
Leak (effective 
diameter of 22% of 
the nominal 
diameter) 
Leak (effective 
diameter of 44% of 
the nominal 
diameter) 
(Large leak) 
Full bore rupture 
Nominal diameter 
< 75 mm 1.18.10
-5 7.93.10-6 3.3.10-6 1.22.10-6 
75 mm ≤ nominal 
diameter ≤ 150 mm 2.5.10
-6 1.11.10-6 4.62.10-7 3.5.10-7 
Nominal diameter 
> 150 mm 1.75.10
-6 6.5.10-7 2.7.10-7 1.18.10-7  
TAB 2 Example of pipe failure frequencies  
The overall occurrence frequency of a scenario then simply combines the LOC failure frequency with 
the frequency of the additional condition which makes the scenario come into reality, in general the 
ignition. The ignition probability for highly reactive gases or extremely flammable liquids is almost 1 
and is regarded to be close to 1 for other hazardous substances. The real difference in the assessment is 
the factor of immediate or delayed ignition which usually is determined on a conventional basis by 
assumptions derived from accident histories and rough estimates.  
The interface between the Loss of Containment and various scenario types with ignition of the 
substance concerned is shown below. The main difference depends on the form of storage or process (if 
the containing takes place under atmospheric conditions or pressure). 
                                                 
39 Committee for the Prevention Disasters (CPR), 1999, "Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment-“Purple 
Book” CPR18E, SDU, The Hague 
40 HSE, “Failure rate and event data for use in risk assessment (FRED)” , issue 1, Nov 99 (RAS/99/20) – HSE, 
“New failure rates for land use planning QRA Update” RAS/00/22 - HSE, “Chapter 6K: Failure rate and event 
data for use within risk assessments” 2/09/2003 
41 Taylor, J.R. “Hazardous materials release and accident frequencies for process plant”-draft version 2003 – for 
the time being not free for public use 
42 Handboek Kanscijfers voor het opstellen van een Veiligheidsrapport, 1/10/2004, AMINAL – Afdeling 
Algemeen Milieu- en Natuurbeleid.  
43 Refer to http://aramis.jrc.it 
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FIG 5 Interface of scenario types with forms of containing and ignition 
 
The likelihood value of the unrestricted final scenario (more precisely the “dangerous phenomenon”) 
depends on the assumptions for the distribution in the event trees shown above; this is based on 
conventional agreements which themselves are rough estimates of historic data.  
Common default values for this calculation are: 
 
- 70 % immediate ignition 
- 30 % delayed ignition 
- 67 % of delayed ignitions result in a VCE 
- 33 % of delayed ignitions result in a flashfire or jetfire. 
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The second main element of the scenario selection is the assessment of the efficiency of measures. 
According to the “Guidance LUP” measures may be grouped into the following categories: 
 
- “Avoid Measures”: the scenario will not occur (example: burying a vessel will prevent a 
BLEVE) 
- “Prevention Measures”: the frequency of a scenario is reduced (example: automated systems to 
prevent overfilling)  
- “Control  Measures”: the size, severity or extent of the scenario is reduced (example: gas 
detectors operating block valves) 
- “Mitigate Measures”: the size, severity or extent of the effects is reduced (example: firewalls) 
 
The necessary steps at this stage are  
 
• Identification of causes or cause categories related to the scenarios 
• Identification of measures 
• Allocation of efficiency values to the measures 
 
It is up to the individual user or MS system which types of measures are taken into account and what 
and how the efficiency is assessed. Some approaches may only consider passive measures (no human 
intervention or measurement of parameters necessary); some approaches may consider technical 
measures, some also “behavioural” measures44. 
 
The same is valid for the efficiency assessment. A common way for the numerical assessment of the 
performance of measures is the “class of confidence – probability of failure on demand” – approach; 
see as an example the table below: 
 
Class of confidence Probability of Failure on 
Demand (PFD) 
Risk Reduction Factor 
4 10-5  -  10-4 10.000 
3 10-4  -  10-3 1.000 
2 10-3 -  10-2 100 
1 10-1 -  10-1 10 
 
TAB 3 Example of “class of confidence – probability of failure on demand” approach. 
 
The third necessary element to make the quantitative selection workable is the definition of “cut – off” 
– criteria; this means, numerical values must be fixed which indicate the borderline to the “negligible 
area”, the likelihood which may be regarded too low to be taken into account. As already stated in this 
document, the correct procedure would require the consideration of the uncertainty of values, the 
“variance”. The problem of uncertainty in the single – value quantitative concept means that the scope 
for the likelihood of concern is very broad, which leads to the need to include causes and scenarios of 
comparatively low predicted frequency to be  taken into account.  
An example for common numerical border values is shown in the picture below [FIG 6]: ….) 
 
                                                 
44 More information for this distinction is given in chapter VI 
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FIG 6 Example of Bow-Tie model to show common numerical values 
 
b) Qualitative Decision: 
 
The selection of scenarios may be based on a qualitative estimate of the consequences only, which 
means an expert judgment on the expected damage (severe, medium, low etc.). But the main problem is 
the definition of the scenarios before this step.  
Any deterministic safety concept is based on long – term experience with certain processes and 
technical solutions and gives preference to the use of the precautionary principle. The decision is not 
targeted at a value expressing the risk but seeks to avoid undesirable incidents as much as possible by 
process design, operation and prevention measures. The necessary knowledge based is mainly laid 
down in codes, standards or ordinances, which makes it complicated to identify underlying scenarios as 
these are usually not defined explicitly. Nevertheless there is a need to reduce the residual risk by land-
use planning methods as required by Article 12 of Seveso II, so a possible concept may be to select 
some representative scenarios according to the exclusion of some measures of lower efficiency or 
reliability. There are similarities to the quantitative selection, but in this case without assigning values 
to the various steps, which are  
 
 Deterministic (conventional) assumption of a loss of containment (LOC) 
 Assumption of type of LOC and criteria for that (e.g. excluding catastrophic rupture because of 
failure rate data) 
 Identification of measures to avoid the LOC 
 Qualitative criteria for the consideration of certain measures 
 
 
In the figure below the approach is shown in a summarizing form: 
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FIG 7 Example of criteria for LOC efficiency and reliability 
It is important to understand that the qualitative risk analysis for land – use planning may somehow 
represent a contradiction to the outcome of a permit process for an establishment and must be 
communicated in a proper way. 
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IV. TOLERABILITY/VULNERABILITY 
 
1. Basic process of measuring compatibility 
 
In a recent study, the interesting difference between the different “wording” used in risk assessment 
depending on national risk regulations and ‘philosophies’ was examined45. The benchmark between The 
United Kingdom and The Netherlands outlined how, due to the different legal backgrounds (common 
law vs. civil law) and to the different interpretation of endpoints as legally binding thresholds, ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) and ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) are not 
synonymous. The United Kingdom context aims at risk tolerability, in the Dutch one aims at risk 
acceptability. These are significantly different, given that the methodological approaches in the two 
countries are broadly similar and based on at least the partial quantification of risks. The difference is 
that “[…] whereas the criteria in the Netherlands are the end of the discussion, in the United Kingdom 
they are the starting point”. Hence, even here, the core of decisions is not the application of criteria – 
but the discussion about their nature and uses.  
This premise serves to introduce the unavoidable political nature of every decision related to risk 
reduction, regardless of the grounds represented by the quantitative outcomes of risk analysis. Yet these 
outcomes, when carried out LUP purposes, need  to be assessed against pre-defined criteria and values.  
As reported by the mentioned Author, their meanings and roles within practical cases depend on 
national contexts. In all the analyzed countries, risk criteria and the threshold values are defined in 
specific regulations and laws. Therefore, regardless the adopted method, the risk analysis informs 
subsequent planning evaluations (in the form of permission or restriction of given land-use purposes 
and/or construction) by means of the adopted criteria and the defined endpoints for each criterion. In 
this respect, the assumption is that a LUP regulatory system exists. A scheme relative to this ‘link’ 
between risk analysis and LUP is reported in the following. 
 
 
FIG 8 The link between scenarios/risk measures and compatibility decisions 
 
 
                                                 
45 Ale B.J.M. (2005). Tolerable or Acceptable: A comparison of Risk Regulation in The United Kingdom and in 
The Netherlands. Risk Analysis, Vol.25, No.2, 231-241 
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2. Compatibility Decision Systematic   
 
a) General Considerations  
 
Usually the compatibility is measured by means of a “risk index” which must be understood in a very 
broad sense. A risk index is a measure, quantitative or qualitative, oriented to integrating into a 
numerical value or into a written description, which represent an influence on the hazards or the risk 
of a system. 
A risk index as meant in this respect is not a direct measure of the risk but more some kind of an 
indicative parameter. Some indexes use a numerical scale to evaluate the “level of risk” of a given 
system, other indexes do not use numerical values and just qualify the risk as “low”, “medium”, “high”, 
etc. This type of classification is closer to the usual language and, sometimes, is adequate for the 
accuracy of the measure (which may not justify a numerical value). Nevertheless, in some cases 
categories like “low risk” may lead to an acceptance of situations that imply really a significant risk, 
which could be reduced with additional measures. Both criteria can be used and, in fact, both are used 
in practice.  
 
Risk indexes can be classified according to different criteria. One possibility is the classification into 
the following: 
 
• Risk indexes based on the mathematical definition of risk: These are indexes are defined according 
to the general definition Risk = Frequency x Magnitude/Severity.  
• Risk indexes based on the hazards of the substances involved: In this type of indexes the risks 
associated to fire, explosion, release, toxic cloud/vapour dispersion, etc. are analyzed.  
 
As for the level of tolerable risk quantitative thresholds are defined, involved targets are usually 
measured against different categories (for example low, medium and high) for which vulnerability’s 
indicators are usually given. A general example is shown below. 
 
 
FIG 9 Negligible, residual and unacceptable risk levels 
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 30
The likelihood measure may be expressed either numerically, e. g. yearly occurrence of an undesirable 
event in the range of 10-3 – 10-9, or qualitatively (e. g. very likely to very unlikely). The severity may be 
expressed quantitatively by numerical effect “endpoints” or risk figures (individual, societal), 
qualitatively from “low” to “high”. A possible ranking for severity is shown in the table below: 
 
Consequence Classification 
Effects on human targets Effects on environment 
No injury or slight injuries without 
sick leave No action needed but surveillance 
Injuries leading to an hospitalization
Serious effects on the environment 
inside the establishment, requiring 
local means of intervention 
Irreversible injuries or death inside 
the establishment, reversible injuries 
outside the establishment 
Reversible effects on the 
environment outside the 
establishment; requiring national 
means 
Irreversible injuries or death outside 
the establishment 
Irreversible effects on the 
environment outside the 
establishment; requiring national 
means 
 
TAB 4  Consequence classification for human and environmental targets. 
 
The main tools used in practice linking accident scenarios with targets’ vulnerability are reported 
below: 
 
• Consequence estimation/ modelling 
• risk matrix, representing the compatibility between defined level of risk and urban/ 
environmental development;  
• consequence endpoint values, representing the “extension” of the selected scenarios in terms 
of effects and relative injuries (for example, the representation could be the irreversible 
damage threshold of a scenario where no residential development is allowed);   
• individual risk, associating to effects areas a frequency endpoint (for example, 10-6 irreversible 
damage area where only limited residential developments are allowed);   
• societal risk (F/N-curve).   
 
Tolerability Evaluation Tool Related RA Method 
 
Risk Matrix 
Qualitative/deterministic 
Semi-quantitative 
Quantitative/probabilistic 
Consequence endpoint values Qualitative/deterministic 
Individual Risk Quantitative/probabilistic 
Societal Risk (F/N-curve) Quantitative/probabilistic 
 
TAB 5 The relation between tolerability evaluation tools and risk analysis methods. 
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b) Endpoints 
According to the types of scenarios the following effect types may be distinguished: 
Scenario Types Dangerous 
Phenomenon Thermal Radiation Overpressure Toxic Effects 
Fireball x x  
Flashfire x   
Jetfire x   
Poolfire x   
VCE x x  
Toxic Clouds   x 
Solids Fire  x   
TAB 6 Effects related to different kind of scenarios. 
 
Another distinction concerns the duration of the effect, as shown below: 
Dangerous 
Phenomenon 
Effect Type 
 Stationary Radiation Non – stationary 
Radiation 
Overpressure (fixed 
value) 
Fireball  x x 
Flashfire  x  
Jetfire x   
Poolfire x   
VCE  x x 
Solids Fire x   
 TAB 7 Stationary, non-stationary and fixed effects. 
 
“Non – stationary” means that the effect is calculated on the basis of an equation that takes into account 
the actual time of exposure which may be very short in the case of certain scenarios.  
Another distinction concerns the basic choice between  
- Fixed endpoints or 
- Probit endpoints. 
 
“Fixed endpoints” means that the threshold characterizes one specific level of harm for any single 
recipient. Probit endpoints consider a certain percentage of damage or harm in a number of recipients (= 
the likelihood that in a given group a certain, predefined percentage will have definite symptoms or 
“suffer in the same form”) and take account of exposure time – probits are calculated by generally 
accepted and validated equations which are specific to the materials of concern.  
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For thermal radiation and overpressure the following values may serve as default figures: 
 
Level Stationary Radiation Non – stationary 
Radiation 
Overpressure 
No effect 1,6 kW/m2   
Small effects < 3 – < 5 kW/m2 < 125 kJ/m2 < 30 mbar  
Reversible effects < 3 – < 5 kW/m2 125 – < 200 kJ/m2 30 - < 50 mbar 
Irreversible effects 5 – 7 kW/m2 200 - 350 kJ/m2 50 – 140 mbar 
Lethality > 7 kW/m2 > 350 kJ/m2 > 140 mbar 
TAB 8 Endpoints values for different effects’ levels.  
 
Whereas the definition of physical hazards is comparatively easy (the divergence of accepted thresholds 
is not wide and the main difference lies in the decision which levels of effects should be taken into 
account), for toxic effects the situation is more complex: 
 
− Countries with existing concepts only agree one threshold, which is the level corresponding to the 
start of the certain effects (for example irreversible health effect). 
− There are various exposure guidelines; the selection of one of them based on scientific expertise is 
difficult (finding evidence of the effects of a given toxic substance in humans is often 
unmanageable, so the experimentation is usually done in animals and the values obtained 
extrapolated to humans). 
− Each source guideline (e.g. American Institute of Industrial Hygienists Emergency Response 
Planning Guidlelines – ERPGs) covers only a limited number of substances. 
− The effects of toxic substances on humans are in some  cases related to the dose and not to a given 
concentration. 
− The dose may depend not only on the concentration value and the exposure time but also on other 
parameters which depend on the substance and may be unknown.  
− The effects on exposed persons is greatly affected by their health condition, age etc, 
 
Currently three databases for toxic effects are widely used: IDLH, ERPG and AEGL. 
 
• Immediately Dangerous for Life and Health (IDLH): 
These values are defined by NIOSH46 as 30-minute concentrations from which a worker could escape 
without injury or irreversible health effects in the event of respiratory protection equipment failure and 
above which “high reliable” respirators are required. These levels were designed for healthy workers in 
an exposure situation that it is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse health 
effects or prevent escape from such an environment. 
• Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) 
Are defined by the American Industrial Hygiene Association47 as concentration ranges where adverse 
health effects could be observed. The ERPG guidelines do not protect everyone. Hypersensitive 
individuals would suffer adverse reactions to concentrations far below those suggested in the 
guidelines. ERPGs are focused on a one hour period of exposure.  
                                                 
46 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, USA. Online: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh  
47 Online: http://www.aiha.org  
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ERPG-1 
Is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or 
perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor. 
ERPG-2 
Is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects 
or symptoms which could impair an individual’s ability to take protective action. 
ERPG3 
Is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects. 
• Acute Emergency Guidance Levels (AEGL) 
Acute Exposure Guideline Levels are under development by the National Research Council’s 
Committee on Toxicology48 The committee developed detailed guidelines for developing uniform, 
meaningful emergency response standards for the general public. The criteria in the guidelines take into 
account sensitive individuals and are meant to protect nearly all people. The guidelines define three-
tiered AEGLs as follows: 
 
AEGL-1 
Is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, 
including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain 
asymptomatic non - sensory effects. 
 
AEGL-2 
Is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, 
including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse 
health effects or an impaired ability to escape. 
 
AEGL-3 
Is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, 
including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death. 
 
Each of the three levels of AEGL, are developed for each of five exposure periods: 10 minutes, 30 
minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours. 
It is obvious from the description of the thresholds that they are not originally developed for LUP 
purposes but serve for emergency response planning; nevertheless they are the only sources for the 
calculation of distances to be defined for land – use planning with regard to other conditions, as there 
may be: 
- the assumption that an alert system will function and the potentially exposed population will be 
in a safe location after a given time 
- on -site intervention within the emergency response  limits the release rate and thus the exposure 
period and concentration 
                                                 
48 Information are available online via the (American) Environmental Protection Agency website, 
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/aegl/  
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- regard to the mobility of the exposed population and their expected behavior in an alert situation 
(e. g. children or elderly persons) 
Furthermore it is important to note that, unlike the question of exposure to physical hazards, toxic 
thresholds differ not only in reference time but also they are a product of several pragmatic 
considerations and – due to the time of their origin – give different regard to the scientific knowledge. 
As an example see the next table: 
 
Thresholds for toxic substances (ppm) 
Substance IDLH (30 mins) ERPG 3 (1 hr) AEGL 3 (1 hr) 
Ammonia 300 1000 1100 
Bromine 3 5 8,5 
Chlorine 10 20 20 
Hydrogen Chloride 50 100 100 
Hydrogen Fluoride 30 50 44 
Formaldehyde 20 25 56 
Phenol 250 200 Not recommended 
Phosgene 2 1 0,75 
Sulfur Dioxide 100 15 30 
Hydrogen Sulfide 100 100 50 
 
TAB 9 Toxic substance threshold comparison  
3. Risk Measure: Target Values 
The decision flow after the on the structure of a LUP risk assessment system requires a step to define a 
definite risk measure. In principle the following options exist (as the existing examples are usually 
aimed to protect humans, environmental aspects are excluded from this description): 
- entirely qualitative measure; in that case no explicit definitions are necessary 
- qualitative measure derived from effect thresholds; in that case it is only necessary to define the 
recipient and the number of exposed persons – in most cases it will be one individual which is 
the “target of concern” 
- quantitative measure: this may consider an individual or a group which might be exposed. 
 
For the first option a decision is made within the defined qualitative tolerable or acceptable criteria. In 
the second case the thresholds defined in the previous chapter are the relevant elements. In the last case, 
however, an additional decision needs to be made. This comprises three basic elements: 
- the decision if the risk goal is one individual or a group of individuals, 
- the decision of numeric values for these risks and for comparison - 
- the definition of a numeric value for the tolerability/acceptability of the calculated risk.  
Definition of the individual risk: “The probability that an individual will experience an adverse 
effect”49; the type of adverse effect needs to be defined additionally, e. g. fatality or the chance to 
                                                 
49 US-EPA 
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receive a dangerous dose of a given exposure. The result is usually plotted by iso-risk curves that 
indicate equal levels of individual risk: 
. 
FIG 10 Example of individual iso-risk contours 
 
Definition of the societal risk: "the relation between frequency and the number of people suffering from 
a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified hazards"50. The result is 
usually presented in the form of an F – N – curve51 which plots the probable frequency of hazardous 
events against the number of potential adverse effects, e. g. the number of fatalities (see example 
below). 
 
FIG 11 Example of F/N - diagram 
 
The third element within a “full quantitative risk measure” is the comparison against a threshold. The 
most common terms in this respect are “risk acceptability” and “risk tolerability”.  Both terms are used 
as synonyms in many cases, defining them by “the willingness to live with a certain risk in order to 
secure certain benefits”52. For the use within the technical/land-use planning field the interface as 
shown below is commonly known. 
                                                 
50 Defined e. g. by HSE (1989), Risk criteria for land-use planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazards, HM 
Stationery Office. 
51 As proposed by Ale B.,(1996), Zoning instruments for major accident prevention, Proc. ESREL/PSIAM, Crete, 
p.1911. 
52 OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
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FIG 12 Representation of risk increase and willingness live in its vicinity 
Linked with the border areas above, numerical risk criteria would normally be defined; the broadly 
acceptable region is usually seen as an occurrence with a likelihood < 10-6 per year. The unacceptable 
region is characterized by occurrences > 10-4 per year whereas the region between these values is 
subject to consideration of the practicality and reasonableness of measures. In same member states the 
values may differ, for instance according to factors like the variation between new and existing 
establishments. 
 
4. Vulnerability aspects in risk assessment: environmental vulnerability/recent developments  
 
Although the vulnerability concept is a core element of several European environmental procedures – 
like the EIA and the SEA – methods for its evaluation are mostly under development.  
What does ‘vulnerable’ refer to? The EEA Glossary gives the following definition:  
‘the degree to which a systems is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, injury damage or harm”53. 
Hence, in the context of the Seveso II, “vulnerable” is the system which involvement in a given 
scenario will lead to its injury (human system) or damage (natural and built environment systems). In 
the context of Seveso II in fact, “vulnerable” refers both to the natural and the built environment. The 
vulnerability assessment is, in the first case, easier, as it takes advantage of the possibility of evaluating 
experimentally the capacity of humans to resist to a given toxic, radiation or overpressure exposure. In 
the second case, being “environment” a general term referring to a complex and site-specific fauna and 
flora system, the evaluation of its capacity to cope with an accident scenario is less obvious. 
Consequently, for evaluating environmental risk (with the implicit or explicit consideration of 
vulnerability), there are few standardized tools. Models to predict the size of polluted areas (e.g. in 
groundwater, surface water, etc.), given a certain pollution source, are used to assess one particular 
scenario. In the Netherlands, a model called PROTEUS has been developed to consider and analyse the 
suitability of transport routes to particularly vulnerable receptors. PROTEUS is an example of the 
integration of the concept of vulnerability within a quantitative assessment, as it considers the sources 
of accident pollution and the vulnerable receptors (ecological environment). They may involve 
following a combination of routes. The output is the assessment of risk reduction measures. 
                                                 
53 Refer to EEA Glossary, http://glossary.eea.europa.eu/EEAGlossary  
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Regardless the development of models addressing specific pollution and/or risk matters, the concept of 
vulnerability of interest for the implementation of Article 12 is that  related to the possibility of 
preserving (human vulnerability) and saving/restoring (environmental vulnerability) the system (in the 
following: the targets) which is damaged by an accident. In both cases, the definition of indicators may 
support a ranking of the targets and, consequently, the identification of suitable land-uses. This 
approach has been developed in several European countries. 
In the United Kingdom, a National Population Database mapping the vulnerability on a GIS platform of 
the population with respect to gender, age, sex, health status and density was recently developed by 
HSE54. In the Netherlands, a mapping of the national territory on the base of vulnerability categories 
(low, medium and high) that considers a multi-risk situation is developed by RIVM55 in the 
Netherlands. In Italy, a set of indicators for assessing the vulnerability of land-uses on the basis among 
other criteria, of the evacuation capacity of buildings, the capacity of transportation routes and the 
possibility of restoring damaged natural areas are defined in a specific decree56.  
The last example is one of the few addressing, on a legal basis, the environmental vulnerability 
indicators issue. The difficulty of defining vulnerability indicators for what lies behind the general 
concept of “environment” is obvious. Nevertheless, recent studies in the European research framework 
promote promising perspectives. Estimating the human, environmental and material vulnerabilities57 
has proved useful in characterising Seveso II areas on the basis of a semi-quantitative-multicriteria 
approach.  
Returning to national approaches, in the above mentioned Italian case a tolerability threshold for 
environmental indicators is also given. This states that any pollution which cannot be restored within 2 
years considered as unacceptable. However, this requirement does not specify measures to be taken 
follows, nor is the meaning of “restoration” itself is defined. This may not always be possible. For 
example, to recreate original conditions or to assess the time required for this even when possible. The 
approach seems therefore open to further development.  
In Sweden a simplified index accounting the quantity and the properties of the substances (toxicity, 
biodegradation, bioaccumulation, etc.) was defined. For release of toxic substance into the aquatic 
environment the equation is:  
Hazard Index = K * Toxicity * Amount * (Consistency + solubility/volatility + Bioaccumulation + 
Biodegradation) 
In Spain guidelines for the assessment of environmental risk, based on indexes, were also developed. 
An index for the amount and the properties of the substance, based on the Swedish equation, is used for 
assessing the “vector” represented by transport routes (i.e. to assess how easily environmental 
vulnerable receptors may be reached).  The likelihood of the scenario and the existence of vulnerable 
areas (ecosystems, environmentally sensitive areas) are also assessed. All these indexes are then 
combined to provide an overall index, which expresses the environmental risk.  
An overall list of developed national approaches is not the purpose of this document; but it is useful to 
mention that experiences and guidelines developed in the United Kingdom and France are opening up 
promising perspectives. In the following table, a list of possible criteria is given in the table below. 
                                                 
54 Smith G., Arnot C., Fairburn J. and Walker G. (2005), A National Population Database for Major Accident 
Hazard Modelling. HSE Research Report 297. 
55 Refer to www.rivm.nl  
56 DM 9 Maggio 2001, Requisiti minimi di sicurezza in materia di pianificazione urbanistica e territoriale per le 
zone interessate da stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante, Suppl. GAZZETTA UFFICIALE N. 138/06/01. 
57 Refer to Tixier J. et all (2006), Environmental vulnerability assessment in the vicinity of an industrial site in the 
frame of ARAMIS European project, Journal of Hazardous Material 130, 251-264. In this study, Here, the 
environment is divided into four sub-systems (agricultural, natural, site-specific and wetlands systems) which 
sensitivity for overpressure, thermal flux, toxicity and pollution is estimated through an expert-judgment 
approach. A global vulnerability index, accounting the environmental vulnerability for a 20%, is therefore 
assessed and mapped on a standard GIS format.  
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 Vulnerable  
objects  
 
Possible criteria 
Residential areas • Population density;  
• Building types (fire protection, evacuation facilities). 
Buildings and  
areas  
of public use 
• Customer frequency (shopping malls, sports grounds); 
• Customer mobility (hospitals, schools etc.);  
• “Public use” (i.e. equal conditions of access);  
• Alert problems 
Major transport  
routes 
• Transport routes with traffic frequencies (below the following 
values, they may not be considered as major ones): 
- roads with less than 10.000 passenger vehicles per 24 
hours 
- railroads with less than 50 passenger trains per 24 hour. 
• Transport routes with traffic frequencies (above the following 
values, they shall be accounted as major transport routes):  
- motorways (speed limit > 100 km/h) with more than 
200.000 vehicles per 24 hours or 7000 vehicles per peak hour 
- other roads (speed limit ≤ 100 km/h) with more than 
100.000 vehicles per hour or more than 4000 vehicles per peak 
hour 
- railroad lines with more than 250 trains per 24 hours or 
more than 60 trains per peak hour (both directions together) 
- Transport routes through vulnerable areas (population or 
environmental sensitivity) 
Recreational  
areas 
• Alert problems (existence of evacuation routes/facilities);  
• Visitor frequency and hosting capacity  
Natural areas  
and areas of 
particular  
sensitivity  
or interest 
• Generic natural areas; 
• Natural areas comprising surface/underground water;  
• Natural reserve areas protecting the fauna and flora or 
landscape falling under national or local legislation;  
• Areas of specific scientific interest where landowners are 
obliged to consult conservation bodies prior to a development; 
• Areas with international wildlife or landscape preserve 
designations (e.g. EC Fauna-Flora Habitat Directive, “Ramsar 
- Agreement”, UN world heritage sites etc.);  
• Areas relevant as natural resources to be preserved in their 
condition  
Essential  
functions (water 
supply,   water 
purification, 
sewerage ,  
energy supply) 
• Characteristic and positions of supply networks; nr. of people x 
cut off time (water system, energy system)58.  
 
TAB 10 Classification of vulnerable elements and criteria for their assessment. 
 
                                                 
58 This input is of the Finnish Agency TUKES (Safety Technology Authority, Online: www.tukes.fi).  
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V. ZONING 
 
LUP is a decision process leading to the destignation of specific uses to land units accordingly to a 
broader urban planning perspective. Here, the economic, societal and urban development necessities of 
a given area (usually falling under the same local administration) are considered in terms of the 
functions to be assigned to private and public land areas. Basically, the vicinity of homogenous land 
portions leads to the ordinary configuration of the European territory as a mixture of residential, 
industrial, service, archaeological, historical and natural areas. In this simple description, clearly the 
complexity of the urban planning discipline does not appear to be as complex as it actually proves to be. 
Yet this complexity is increasingly confronted with the systemic configuration of modern urban 
systems, where vital functions – water supply, waste control, transport – are to be combined with a set 
of elements – residences, services, nature – in an economic and socially sustainable relation. As stated 
in the European Spatial Development Programme, this objective represents the current challenge of the 
European territorial development59. Facing the problem of allocating land-uses in at-risk areas is part of 
this challenge. 
The resultant requirement of Article 12 of Seveso II is the definition of “appropriate distances”. In some 
European concepts (particularly, the German one), this corresponds to the “zoning” practice. Generally, 
“zoning” indicates the practice of dividing the territory in homogenous land units, whose classification 
respond to their function (industrial, residential, etc). In the context of the Seveso II then, “zoning” 
stands for the definition of land use restrictions/designations within calculated distances around the 
establishment. Theoretically, this should result into a precautionary sitting of plants within extra-urban 
industrial areas, and into a restriction of land - use surrounding non-residential developments.  
In other European practices (like the Dutch one) restrictions of land-uses are defined accordingly to 
vulnerability levels. Allowed land-uses are, consequently, those compatible with estimated risks in 
terms of their effect on this vulnerability. The latter refers to the type of function (residential vs. 
industrial), to the density of settlements (low vs. high), etc. The drawing below reports an example60: 
 
 
FIG 13 Safety distances and vulnerable objects in the Dutch approach 
The difference between the two described approaches is evident in the evaluation of the surroundings of 
establishments, which is, in the first case, based on land-uses only, while in the second case it accounts 
a set of criteria leading to a vulnerability estimation of the specific targets. A common denominator is 
the definition of restrictions for land-uses accordingly to endpoints. In the case of a probabilistic risk 
regulation, endpoints values will be represented by the frequencies of events, and estimated effects will 
                                                 
59 Refer to www.espon.eu/  
60 Adapted from Bottelberghs 2005, VROM, The Netherlands 
No effects 
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work as “boundaries” for the construction permits of specified installations. In the deterministic case, 
consequence or effect values will work as limitation for the land-use designations.  
A scheme representing a common decision route for a new development in the vicinity of a Seveso 
establishment is reported in the scheme below: 
 
 
 
 
FIG 14 Example of decisional route to evaluate the compatibility of vulnerable objects and Seveso 
establishments
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VI. ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL MEASURES 
 
The definition of additional technical measures as designated in the LUP-Guidance reads: 
 
“Additional Technical Measures (ATM) in the context of Article 12 of the Seveso II – Directive are 
measures that reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the consequences of a major accent as effective as 
the establishing of a distance to the relevant vulnerable recipient; this involves consideration of 
whether there are measures at or outside the establishment in addition to those already in place”  
 
FIG 15 Role of additional technical measures 
It is outside the scope of this document to list the particular options for additional technical measures in 
detail. It should be noted in this respect that the relevant information will usually come from the safety 
report as required by Article 9 of the Seveso II  Directive (or a similar document according to national 
legislation). This source provides a more generic description of the measures in place or planned. The 
“Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report to meet the requirements of Directive 96/82/EC as 
mended by Directive 2003/105/EC”61 recommends for the necessary amount of information: 
“The description of measures should be limited to the explanation of their specific objectives and 
functions. Specific technical details should (only) be provided within the safety report when its 
necessary to demonstrate that the measures are sufficient”. 
“The safety report should discuss general criteria assumed (for the description of technical 
parameters), should give the reason why a method of presentation has been selected over and above 
other possible options and in particular should describe: 
• The criteria used to decide the degree of redundancy, diversity and separation… 
• The reliability of components and the efficiency of organizational measures 
• The functional calculations needed to confirm the capability of the measures to cope with the 
design-basis accidents” 
The role of technical measures is therefore a more schematic one, giving information on  
                                                 
61 EUR 22113 EN, European Communities 2005 
Scenario leading to a 
dangerous phenomenon 
(Fire, Explosion, Toxic 
Cloud) 
Scenario leading to a 
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(Fire, Explosion, Toxic 
Cloud) + additional 
measures 
Appropriate  
Distance  
Reduced Appropriate  
Distance  
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- function 
- efficiency 
- position (prevention or mitigation/upstream or downstream of the loss of containment 
or dangerous phenomena at the centre of the “bow-tie”.  
Acknowledged basic concepts to define the typology of technical measures are for example 
• the “protection in depth” –  concept62 
• the “protection layer” -  concept63 or 
• the “lines of defence” – concept64. 
A schematic example for these concepts is shown below. 
 
FIG 16 Schematic figures of the relation internal safety – external safety and emergency response 
In the scheme above every line represents a “safety - related function”. In the fault tree the purpose of 
the safety function is to avoid or prevent the occurrence of an event (and thus the dangerous phenomena 
or critical event) in the left side of the “Bow – Tie” or to limit the size of an event by mitigating its 
severity effect within the right side.  
An overall typology of safety functions may distinguish between measures which are constantly 
protecting i.e. permanent and independent of the state of the process (all passive measures are 
permanent), and those activated by the state of the process.  
A more detailed classification can be specified as follows: 
• A. Passive hardware measures (no actuation mechanism required to fulfil its safety function; 
e.g., a retention bund round a tank, enclosure with elevated stack) Passive hardware measures 
have a relatively high level of availability, but in many cases act only to mitigate severity. 
                                                 
62 INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group), Defence in depth in nuclear safety. International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1996 
63 CCPS, Engineering Design for Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York 
64 P.A.M. Uijt de Haag, G.M.H. Laheij, J.G. Post, B.J.M. Ale, L.J. Bellamy, A method to judge the internal risk of 
establishments with dangerous substances, RIVM, Bilthoven, 2001 
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• B. Active hardware measures (require external source of energy to fulfil the safety function but 
operating without or without human intervention, e.g. automatic shutdowns, emergency cooling 
systems, alarms and emergency shutdown systems). 
• C. Passive behavioural measures (behaviour consisting of staying away from defined areas, 
refraining from contacting or modifying parts of the plant. This behaviour alone constitutes the 
barrier without any hardware being involved e.g. safety distances, exclusion areas, no smoking 
area), but normally acts to reduce the frequency of the deviation which starts at the left hand 
side of the bow tie. 
• D. Active behavioural measures (behaviour consists of acting in defined ways whilst interacting 
with the dangerous part of the plant, and this behaviour alone constitutes the barrier without any 
hardware being involved, e.g. evacuation in case of toxic or fire alarm, safe working methods 
when handling chemicals). These generally act as mitigating factors. 
• E. Mixed measures, where both hardware and behaviour are involved, and where, in theory, 
any combination of A and/or B with C and/or D are possible, but where the combination of B 
with D are the most important, since they interact (e.g. shutdown routines triggered by 
warnings). 
 
There is no common line among the Member States approaches on which type of measures are taken 
into account for the selection of scenarios and therefore also no common approach which measures 
qualify as regarded as “additional technical measures” Almost all Member States take into account 
passive measures for the definition of scenarios. Some Member States also take account of active 
hardware or mixed measures, when demonstration is made through safety report of good performance 
of effectiveness and reliability. This may relate to the legal framework of the individual Member State 
reflecting which measures are already ‘mandatory’ or to the established best practice approach. The 
latter may be based on a “cost – benefit”- philosophy (such as is suggested in the ALARP principle), on 
an extensive use of the precautionary principle or principles like “ALARA” (as low as reasonably 
achievable). It is evident that consequently some of these approaches give more room for additional 
technical measures than others; e. g. a very conservative safety concept based on the precautionary 
principle may not offer too many options for additional technical measures.   
The general options for prevention are shown in the picture below. 
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FIG 17 Active and passive measures for risk reduction and emergency response 
For mitigation the various possibilities may be distinguished in a more concrete way according to the 
type of the “dangerous phenomenon” as shown in the next picture. 
 
FIG 18 Mitigation and control of potential accidents
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VII. EXISTING SITUATIONS 
 
Some establishments that fall under the scope of the Seveso Directive have been founded and 
developed across the EU prior to the introduction of LUP controls. Such establishments existing prior to 
Article 12 of Seveso II have legal and continuing rights for their operation and their revocation might 
not be possible or at least not without huge costs. At the same time, communities have grown around 
them, sometimes reliant on their wealth creating benefits. There is a significant synergistic relationship 
between such establishments, its environment and the people working and living nearby. The 
knowledge of relevant risks, hazards and measures to reduce them is definitely features of  the control 
regime but an ideal situation may not be achievable or economically feasible in comparison with a new 
plant. 
“Pre-existing” in the context of Seveso II means 
-  establishments that had a legal right for operation prior to February 3rd 1999 (when the Seveso II 
Directive came into force) or 
-  establishments that did not exceed substance thresholds of Seveso II at that date and fell  into the 
scope later because of subsequent threshold amendments or changes of substance classification.  
Although the application of Article 12 in the case of such an existing situation is triggered only by a 
modification of an existing establishment or a development in the surrounding area (and thus in theory 
no application is necessary for existing situations where the location of a Seveso establishment in the 
given context would be regarded undesirable) certain principles defined for the Article 12 
implementation may be extended to those cases. This recommendation is justified by the fact that many 
of these critical situations are located in urban and densely populated areas. Some key figures65:  
 
- EU 27 – overall area ……………………........4,330.402 km2 
- EU 27 population ………………….............494,607.000  
- EU 27 urban area (> 500 inhabitants/km2)……ca.100.000 km2  
 
These figures show that only 2, 3 % of the European areas are urban agglomerations, as demonstrated 
by the picture below.           
 
FIG 19 Urban agglomeration in the European territory 
                                                 
65 Source: EUROSTAT  
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Many urban developments took place near industrial establishments, mainly built during the “industrial 
revolution” of the 19th century or around World War I, thus creating critical situations from a recent 
viewpoint. Still it is a decisive factor for a growth of industrial establishments to have a big city and 
related infrastructure (airports, harbours) nearby. So we find a “legacy of the past” which now causes 
concern for consequences of major industrial accidents. In the next picture it can be seen that many 
existing industrial agglomerations cover the same area as the urban ones. 
 
 
 
FIG 20 The overlap between urban agglomeration and industrial sites 
The LUP Guidance already proposes several guiding and supporting principles for compliance of land-
use planning with Article 12 of Seveso II. With particular respect to existing situations these principles 
may be summarized66 as follows: 
- Identification  
It is evident that the existence as such of Seveso establishments must be known and communicated to 
the planning authority responsible. 
- Priority to risk prevention and reduction of risk at its source. 
Any industrial establishment must be, in the present and in the future, compatible with its environment 
and therefore, priority should be given to risk prevention and reduction at source. 
-  Risk acceptability 
Once risk prevention and reduction at source have been assessed and done, risk acceptability of the 
establishment should be assessed before any LUP initiatives. 
- Territory concern 
Land-use planning, especially for existing situations, should clearly state that it applies to a territory or 
a site that could be called for example a “risk basin”. Therefore, several installations or establishments 
generating risks on the same territory and belonging to the same “risk basin” should be treated at the 
same time. 
-  Responsibility of the Competent Authority. 
The Competent Authority should accept full responsibility in managing the LUP on existing situations 
development process. 
- Stakeholder engagement. 
Risk communication should be promoted either via partnership (bringing together a limited set of 
relevant stakeholders at work meetings) or via dialogue (bringing together the general public, and 
enabling information sharing and discussion leading to better risk appropriation). 
                                                 
66 Contribution of the French delegation in the EWGLUP 
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-  Consistent policy. 
National principles have to be developed so as to provide local authorities with a general decision-
making process support presenting the necessary flexibility to adapt all decisions to a local context. 
- Full coherence between LUP for future and LUP for existing situations. 
Action on existing situations should enable to reach the same level of safety as the one that is ensured 
by action on future situations. When new installations are authorized, it should not imply action on 
existing elements. 
- Major accident selection. 
The use of identified major accident scenarios should be relevant for the risk prevention policy under 
concern. Special attention should be given to the selection of relevant major accident scenarios for 
LUP-issues, some having to be considered only in emergency plans. This selection has to be done 
following harmonized methods of risk assessment and national criteria. 
-  Balance between actions on the territory and risk reduction at source. 
The LUP process should facilitate the development of regulatory measures equitable to the various local 
stakeholders by achieving a cost-benefit balance between territory and risk reduction at source actions. 
- Co-ordination of risk prevention policies. 
The co-ordination of risk prevention policies should be extensively considered, especially in the light of 
other policies such as emergency planning policies. 
- Technical, strategic aspects and transparent choice. 
An integrative framework for decision-making should be clearly defined. Within this framework, 
special consideration should be given to the following key issues: 
- The Technical assessment sequence. The achievement of this technical sequence should provide 
clear technical results allowing: 
• Each proposed regulatory measure to be well-proportioned and justified;  
• different sets of measures to be compared. 
- The Strategic phase. The achievement of this phase should allow the risk prevention principles 
to be applied on the territory. This phase should take into account all relevant stakeholders of 
the “risk basin” 
- The “synthesis” document. A public document of presentation, which justifies the orientations 
selected during the strategic phase would ensure that the process is clear and well documented. 
 
 
Derived from the LUP Guidance furthermore the following relevant issues for “existing situations of 
concern with respect to Article 12 of Seveso II” may be distinguished: 
 
- Identification: it is evident that the existence as such of Seveso sites must be known and 
communicated to the planning responsible; 
- Pro-active decision-making: it is certainly not judicious to wait for developments to come 
forward as there is constant pressure for new developments especially around cities which 
justifies the recommendation to prepare decisions whenever the fact a Seveso site is identified67 
- Pro-active decision-making: it is certainly not judicious to wait for developments to come 
forward as there is constant pressure for new developments especially around cities which 
justifies the recommendation to prepare decisions whenever the a Seveso establishment or a 
planned development near it is identified68 
                                                 
67 The text of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive does not require any activity in the case of existing situations 
when there is no triggering factor, i. e. a modification of an establishment or a new development in the 
surrounding area. 
68 The text of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive does not require any activity in the case of existing situations 
when there is no triggering factor, i. e. a modification of an establishment or a new development in the 
surrounding area. 
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- Definition of decision indices: since the LUP system in general should be have a consistent 
structure it is necessary to define indices for the decision required by existing Seveso situations 
- Improvement of the situation may be achieved by an array of  activities, as there are additional 
technical measures as described in the previous chapter (on-site, off-site), emergency response 
measures or long-term change of  land-use around the establishment. The decisions on additional 
on-site measures may take into account the standard of safety technology when the 
establishment was built and economically viable improvements. 
 
From the considerations above the following point of concern may be defined: 
- Indices: what are the potential indices to serve as decision-making basics? 
- Prioritization: According to the ranking of indices a prioritization of concrete activities what 
would represent “Best Practice”? 
- Contingencies: what are the options to solve undesirable situations? 
 
The decision as such will normally be based on the overall timeframe and hierarchy of other documents 
and plans, such as strategic plans or development decision factors. It is beyond the scope of this 
document to list those elements. It rightly notes that  the whole process is part of a framework for LUP 
in general. Prioritization is a necessary step that needs no further explanation. It would seem 
appropriate that the possible indices and the contingencies the LUP process for Seveso establishments 
may require further determination. 
 
a) Indices: 
 
In principle there are indices based on risk figures or based on the consequence severity: 
 
- Risk figures: the figures for the individual risk or societal risk as described in chapter IV may 
serve is indices for a subsequent decision process 
- Severity extent: here there are various options, e. g. the inherent properties of the substance(s) 
triggering the decision or the more concrete scenario which takes into account the spatial extent 
of the consequences and the time period of the hazardous scenario. There are also more complex 
concepts that combine effect values with weighting factors in order to calculate an overall index. 
 
b) Contingencies: 
 
The options for activities following the result of the calculation of indices and the priority ranking are in 
principle additional technical measures, relocation of the establishment or changes of the land-use 
around the establishment. 
The matter of additional technical measures is described in the previous chapter as far as concerns 
measures on-site. Besides this option measures may be taken off-site, although there are only limited 
possibilities such as firewalls off-site or the change of the construction of buildings according to the 
actual hazard; furthermore the emergency response measures may offer some improvement (e. g.  alarm 
systems with extended range).  
 
If the situation is extremely undesirable, the decision may result in the relocation of the establishment.  
In all cases the decision might require monetary considerations for the costs of the measures or the 
relocation of the establishment with subsequent incentives for the company to start operation elsewhere. 
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ANNEX I70 
 
Implementing Art 12 of Directive Seveso II 
Selected European practices  
 
  
 
1. UNITED KINGDOM  
 
Top- tier establishments  Lower- tier establishments  
360 71 800  
 
Background  
The United Kingdom has one of the longest European policy formulation experiences in the risk 
prevention domain. A safety culture has been created and supported since the 70’s by one of the best-
known European safety institution, the Health and Safe Executive (in Northern Ireland, the HSE of 
Northern Ireland).  
At National level, with respect to the licensing procedure and risk assessment methods, the legal 
references are the Installation Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations (NIHHS) and/or the Control 
of Industrial Major Accidents Hazard Regulation (CIMAH) 1999. LUP in the surroundings of chemical 
sites is regulated by the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 and the Planning (Hazardous 
Substances) Regulations 1992. 
Territorial planning is managed at two different levels: the Structure Plans (general level) and the Local 
Plans (municipal/ local level). In England and Wales, Structure Plans are prepared by the County 
Councils, which define strategic planning policies. Local Plans instead are under the responsibility of 
the District Councils, which define land-use destinations taking into account the risk prevention 
requirements of the Seveso II Directive.  
Within local plans, the sitting and modification of new establishments and the new urban developments 
in their surroundings are based on HSE advice. For each plant HSE establishes so-called “consultation 
zones”, within which HSE consultation is required for any planning decision. To assess safety 
distances, depending on the substances involved and the kind of scenarios, both the probabilistic and 
the deterministic approaches are used. 
 
1.1Operating permits procedure 
The sitting of new establishments and the modification of existing ones are subject to the “Hazardous 
Substances Consent” procedure. The application is submitted at the local level by the operator to the 
corresponding Hazardous Substances Authority; than the HSE will be consulted on the application. 
HSE that advises Local Authorities both on the requirements to be applied to the plant on case of 
consent (internal safety, operative measures, etc) and on the eventual lack of compatibility with respect 
to surrounding land-use destinations. 
 
1.2 Territorial governance & UK planning instruments  
Planning procedure72 
                                                 
70 It must be noted that, as mentioned also at other parts of this document,  it was left to some extent to the contact 
points to deliver information they regarded relevant. Since there were differences in the amount, the authors tried 
to compress the country examples as far as possible without loosing important information. Nevertheless there are 
still differences of the length of the individual summaries which entirely due to the above mentioned fact. 
71 The numbers indicated at all 5 summaries refer to the information received at the time of the MAHB survey, i.e. 
first half of 2004. 
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The general legislation related to land-use planning in the United Kingdom, England and Wales is: 
• The Town and Country Planning Act 1990;  
 The Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990; and  
 The Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 199073.  
 The Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 1992, as amended by The Planning (Control 
of Major-Accident Hazards) Regulations 1999. These latter regulations have implemented the 
land use planning requirements of the Seveso II Directive [Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 
December 1996].  
Land-use planning and urban and environmental management are under the responsibility of Local 
Planning Authorities. Commonly, Local Plans indicate where land has to be allocated for both human 
developments and industrial installation.  These plans are evaluated with advice from the Health and 
Safety Executive. HSE Although the advice of HSE is not legally binding, if proposed developments in 
the vicinity of hazardous installation are considered to be at risk HSE can apply to the Secretary of State 
to take over the decisions of Planning Authorities .  
After the planning procedure is completed, the adoption of the Local Plan requires the consultation with 
the public; to this scope, several instruments and experiences (supported by open meetings, Public 
Enquiry, press, etc.) were developed I the last years.  
 
1.3 Systematic method in use for LUP in risky areas 
LUP evaluations in the surroundings of plants are carried out by means of the risk analysis developed 
by the HSE. Different methods are used, depending on the specific scenario and substances. Generally, 
advices related to toxic releases refer to the “risk oriented” approach (QRA applied to “…all 
foreseeable scenarios and a representative set of events which describe a set of circumstances which, 
for that installation, could lead to an accidental release of hazardous substances 74), while in the case 
of thermal radiation and explosions the consequence-oriented approach 75 is adopted. In the first case, 
safety distances are assessed against the probability to receive at least a dangerous dose; in the second 
one, safety distances are assessed against the receipt of prescribed thermal dose units76. The criteria 
used to determine the likelihood of incurring these effects are both the individual and the societal risk77. 
The HSE standard method has several well-developed tools for evaluating both. In order to maintain a 
“judgmental approach” and to evaluate every risky situation in its particular aspects, the calculation of 
                                                                                                                                                          
72 Sources: questionnaire submitted within the EWGLUP; literature sources: Risk Criteria for land-use planning 
in the vicinity of major industrial hazards, The Health and Safe Executive, www.hse.co.uk; the National 
Assembly for Wales, Review of Land Use Planning Indicators: Final Report, research carried out by the Wessex 
University, 2003. Web site: http://www.wales.gov.uk.  
73 These Acts were amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. Due to the devolution of planning 
functions and decision-making to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since 1997, planning systems in the 
United Kingdom are diverging from the English model. Scotland and Northern Ireland are using their devolved 
powers for legislation to develop their own national planning frameworks.  
 
74 Refer to HSE’s current approach to land-use planning, http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/lupcurrent.pdf  
75 This difference is based on the characteristic of the explosions and the thermal radiation to present a sharp 
decline at a specific distance, where specific thermal radiation or overpressure is achieved.  
76 Dangerous dose is defined as “[…] a dose which related effects lead to “a substantial fraction requires medical 
attention; some people are seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment; any highly susceptible people might 
be killed.” (HSE 2004). 
77 The two concepts are largely used in both UK and Dutch practice. Nevertheless, some difference exists and 
must be clarified.. Basically, “individual risk” is the risk run by a localized human target within a specific effects 
area, while the societal risk is a measure used to assess the risk of injuries/death of N number of persons 
potentially involved in potential major accidents. While individual risk can be represented on a map on the base of 
endpoint values and frequency thresholds, the societal risk is represented by FN curves on the base of likelihood 
evaluations. Nevertheless, in the UK societal risk evaluations no thresholds apply for LUP purposes. In The 
Netherlands, recent developments in the norms have indicated also target values for societal risk.  
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societal risk results from the integration of the individual risk figure with additional population data. 
The same judgmental approach is applied, for example, to define generic precautionary distances in all 
cases in which a full assessment is not realizable.  
However, when a development is proposed within the consultation zones, a full assessment is 
performed. The scope of this successive accurate analysis is the individualization of the “consulting 
zones”, more or less compatible with the presence of more or less vulnerable urban populations.  
One decisive element of the analysis is the “vulnerability analysis”, where the population, the buildings 
and the infrastructures (generally: the targets) are classified using specific indicators78; four classes of 
decreasing vulnerability (A, B, C and D) are determined. Therefore, the deriving evaluation of 
compatibility can be seen as the “match” among the three variables of frequency, damage and 
vulnerability.  A summary of the criteria is illustrated below:  
 
                 SOCIETAL                                                                       INDIVIDUAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG I.1 - Endpoints for societal and individual risk criteria in the UK approaches 
 
1.4 What “tolerable” means in the UK regulatory framework - status of the adopted criteria 
Generally, the criteria used to assess the risk’s acceptability are those defined in the 3rd report of the 
Advisory Committee on Major Hazards as the so called “protection concept”. In it, the safety distance is 
defined as “…a separation which gives an almost complete protection for lesser and more probable 
accidents and worthwhile protection for major but less probable accidents”79.  
Written in a simple form, the advice provided to the Planning Authorities is based on the above-
mentioned standard criteria and methodology; 3 zone hazard/risk maps and a matrix approach to the 
zones and to the classification of types of developments allow ready access to HSE methodology by 
planners. The clarity of the advice from HSE and the transparency of the information given are the main 
drivers for the wide acceptance of them by the side of Planning A’s. 
 
1.5 Environmental assessment  
With respect to the natural environment, The Environment Agencies (England and Wales) and the 
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA in Scotland) are consulted separately.  
 
1.6 Subjects and competences: transparency of the process - involvement of the public 
Besides HSE, Local Planning Authorities consult the above-mentioned Environmental Agencies for 
planning procedures linked to hazardous plants. All the planning information is accessible to the public, 
and the planning meetings are open to its participation. Planning applications are published in local 
press. Differently than elsewhere (France, Italy) the Safety Report is not a consultable document.  
 
 
                                                 
78 Among them, and with respect to population, there is the class of age, the daily permanence inside the buildings, the 
structural characteristic of them, etc.  
79 Source: UK questionnaire.  
Principles 
Development  
o Highly vulnerable 
o Residential 
o Public attractions 
o Low density  
Implementation 
Judgment 
Zoning 
 
o Inner zone     (10-5) 
o Middle zone   (10-6) 
o Outer zone    (0,3X 10-6) 
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2. FRANCE80  
Top- tier establishments  Lower- tier establishments  
608 495 
 
Background  
 
The definition of the LUP principles in risky areas is up to the Ministère de l’Ecologie, du 
Développement et de l’Aménagement Durables (MEDAD). Other three Ministries – the Ministry for 
Industry, responsible for the DRIRE (Regional Directorate for Industry, Research and Environment), 
the Ministry for the Interior and the Ministry of Labour – share the responsibility for major hazards 
prevention & control.  
 
France has a 200 years history in risk prevention regulations related to dangerous facilities. Between 
1780 and 1800, polluting factories were moved out of Paris and a Napoleon decree established three 
classes of dangerous activities. This 1810 decree can be considered as the first regulation addressing 
risk prevention and enforcing the concept of “safety distances”.  
With respect to the licensing procedure, the modern legal references are the law No. 76-663 of July 19, 
1976 on classified installations for environmental protection and its related decree No. 77-1133 of 
September 21, 1977. Article 3 of the 1976 law concerns specific classified installations with a major 
accident potential; these classified installations are known as AS (Autorisation avec Servitudes, i.e. 
authorisation with LUP restrictions) or top-tier SEVESO establishments. 
Land- use planning in France according to the Seveso II – Directive took mainly place within the 
framework of the law of December 13, 2000 on solidarity and urban renewal that makes mandatory for 
local authorities to account for industrial risk in their LUP documents. But most relevant are the more 
recent policy developments, six years after the SEVESO II directive, the law no. 2003-699 of July 30, 
2003 on the prevention of technological and natural risks and the repair of damage added new measures 
to the pre-existing set of legislative tools. This law is directly inspired by the lessons learnt from the 
AZF accident in Toulouse and from the major floods in the southern part of France in 2002.  
The new law imposes two new tools dealing with top-tier SEVESO establishments enable to improve 
the efficiency of limitation of future construction and to deal with existing situation of concern : 
- For new installations on existing sites, or modification of existing installations that creates 
additional risk, the constraint imposed on land use (servitudes) because of that additional risk 
will be financially compensated for by the operator of the installations creating the risk as it was 
the case for new sites. 
- Plans for technological risk prevention mitigating the residual risk for existing situations (PPRT 
is the French acronym) will be defined and implemented in the areas affected by industrial risk 
created by top-tier SEVESO establishments or sites.  
 
2.1 Operating permits procedure 
 
Operators must hold the permit or Prefect Authorisation to set up and running a plant. The Prefect – the 
national representative at local level - gives it using the advice from the DRIRE, which is responsible 
both for the assessment of the Safety Report and the consultation of the local Authorities/ interests at 
the stake. Industrial activities are classified according to their potential dangerousness and eventually to 
their potential impacts on the environment: 
                                                 
80 Sources: questionnaire submitted within the EWGLUP. Literature sources: Christou et  al (1996), Land-use 
planning in the context of Major Accidents Hazards,  Report EUR 16452 EN; Jones (1997), The regulation of 
Major Hazards in France, Germany, Finland and The Netherlands, research commissioned by The Health and 
Safe Executive, London.   
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- Low dangerousness: declaration scheme (D). A simple declaration is required at the Prefecture.  
- Medium dangerousness: authorisation scheme81 (A). A safety report and an environmental 
impact assessment are compulsory. 
- High dangerousness: authorisation scheme with land-use restrictions82 (AS, or top-tier 
SEVESO). Land-use restrictions are possible in addition to A establishment requirements. 
 
For A and AS establishments the safety report – under the responsibility of the operator - provides 
relevant information to the administration for the authorisation, refusal or authorisation subject to 
conditions. Hereby the Prefect supported by DRIRE is enabled to evaluate the compatibility of the 
establishment to its environment using a national acceptability matrix83 which defines the rules 
depending on the combined probability-gravity parameters. Three areas are defined:  
 
- An unacceptable area: risk deemed too high, no authorization in current state. 
- An intermediate area: authorization given after verification that all risk control measures at an 
acceptable cost have been put in place. 
- An acceptable area for which authorization can be given. 
  
2.2 Territorial governance & French planning instruments  
 
Planning procedure 
French Land-Use Planning is based on the Code de l’Urbanisme, which Article 110 prescribes that the 
destinations of land-uses must ensure the public health and safety and, specifically, that the prevention 
of technological risks are taken into account within the urban instruments (Article 121-1).  
Urban planning is performed at two levels: the first is the Schema De Coherence Territorial (SCOT), 
defining a general city-regional level project coherent with the principles of sustainable development, 
concerning both the present and the future situation up to 30 years (i.e. strategic planning). The second 
level is the Plan Local d’Urbanisme (PLU), defining the general regulation for land-use within the 
Municipalities. The PLU contains, for instance, the zoning map and the rules applicable to the land 
covered by the plan itself.  
  
2.3 Systematic method in use for LUP in risky areas 
 
General framework 
In order to support the planning activity, the Mayor is informed (Porter à Connaissance) by the Prefect 
on the risk is aware of and that should be accounted for in LUP documents (SCOT, PLU). 
The Porter à Connaissance is mainly based on the she safety report outputs. Following the 2003 law 
and the regulatory developments with respect to the safety report risk assessment, the Circular of May 4 
2007 has been issued to deal with new aspects (especially the probability parameter): technological risk 
information - Porter à Connaissance - and land-use planning around classified installations. It is stated 
that this information document should include two parts: 
 
- A first part dealing with the aléas84.  
- A second part dealing with LUP recommendations based on the aléas levels. 
                                                 
81 About 61.000 establishments 
82 About 600 establishments 
83 Known as the “MMR matrix” (Mesure de Maîtrise des Risques, i.e. risk control measures) 
84 Probability that a dangerous phenomenon creates effects of a given intensity over determined period of time at a 
given point of the territory. (French word, not translated because of its specificity). 
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Moreover, in addition to LUP tools (PLU) the Code de l’Urbanisme enables the Mayor to refuse a 
building permit if he judges that the “constructions, with respect to their location or dimension, are of 
such a type as to put public safety or health into jeopardy”.  
Finally, the Prefect could use two strongly-effective tools: 
 
- The “project of general interest” (Projet d’Intérêt Général- PIG). The PIG enables the Prefect to 
override the decision concerning the land-use in risky areas if the latter has not been taken into 
account enough. 
- The land-use restriction around top-tier SEVESO establishment (Autorisation avec Servitudes) 
 
2.3.1 PPRT around top-tier SEVESO establishment: LUP for existing situations 
 
The 2003 law created technological risk prevention plans (PPRT); their objective is to resolve difficult 
land-use planning situations inherited from the past and to set the framework for future land-use 
planning. These plans aim at mitigating the residual risk, after risk prevention measures at source have 
been taken. They delineate a perimeter within which requirements can be imposed on existing and 
future buildings: 
  
- Restrictions of future construction and land use. 
- Consolidation of existing constructions (blast-proof windows…). 
- In the areas exposed to very hazardous risks, existing buildings and constructions could be 
expropriated.  
- In areas exposed to hazardous risks, owners could be given the right to force the city (or local 
community in charge of LUP) to buy their real estate. 
 
Moreover, additional risk reduction measures at sources could be investigated if their cost balances the 
real estate measure cost that is avoided. These plans are elaborated on a local level under the Prefect 
responsibility, after a public consultation and in partnership with relevant local stakeholders. Once 
approved by the local state representative (Préfet), it becomes a LUP regulation. 
 
2.4 What “tolerable” means in the French framework - status of the adopted criteria  
 
Tolerability 
approach  
Related risk 
management policy 
Objective Regulatory text 
Endpoint values Safety report 
 
Used by the operator evaluate 
distances for each accident (i.e. 
intensity) 
Arrêté du 29 septembre 2005 relatif à 
l’évaluation et à la prise en compte de la 
probabilité d’occurrence, de la cinétique, de 
l’intensité des effets et de la gravité des conséq 
uences des accidents potentiels dans les études 
de dangers des installations classées soumises à 
autorisation. 
Risk Matrix Permit to operate:  
MMR 
 
Used by the prefect to evaluate 
the compatibility of SEVESO 
establishment to the environment 
Circulaire du 29 septembre 2005 relative aux 
critères d’appréciation de la démarche de 
maîtrise des risques d’accidents susceptibles de 
survenir dans les établissements dits « SEVESO 
», visés par l’arrêté du 10 mai 2000 modifié 
 
Individual Risk LUP: PPRT around 
top-tier SEVESO site 
Used to determine LUP zoning 
for existing and future building 
Guide PPRT, MEDD-DGUHC, 2005 
TAB I.1 - The generic relation between tolerability approaches and risk management policy 
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2.4.1 Endpoint values 
 
French major accident risk regulation refers to endpoint values that are used to calculate “intensity” of 
phenomena. 
 
Level of effects on human 
 
     
    Effects  
Significant lethal effect threshold Lethal effect threshold Irreversible effect threshold 
 
Toxic 
 
Lethal concentration 5%  Lethal concentration1% Irreversible effect 
 
Thermal  8 kW /m2  or (1800 kW/m²)^4/3.s  
5 kW / m2 or 
(1000 
kW/m²)^4/3.s 
3 kW / m2 or  (600 
kW/m²)^4/3.s 
 
Overpressure 
 
200 mbar  140 mbar  50  mbar Indirect 
20 mbar 
TAB I.2 - endpoint values adopted in France 
 
2.4.2 Risk matrix 
 
In the safety report, the hazardous phenomena and associated major accidents are characterised 
according to three parameters: 
- probability: it is assessed by class of probability, according to a national scale of five categories 
of probability from A (> 10-2/year) to E (<10-5/year). The characterisation method is left to the 
choice of the operator. Within this approach, real performances of risk control measures to 
reduce the probability of events occurring are taken into account. The probabilities of catalyst 
events are assessed taking into account feedback from the operator or the industrial sector. The 
operator must demonstrate performance of risk control measures. 
- intensity: this is determined by calculating effect distances associated with national effect 
thresholds corresponding to four types of effect: significant lethal effects, first lethal effects, 
irreversible injury, reversible injury or broken glass. Distances are not generic but calculated for 
each hazardous phenomenon taking into account barrier performances (response times, 
effectiveness) and site conditions (weather conditions, etc.). 
- gravity of effects: this is established using intensities by assessing the number of potential 
victims in the accident’s effect envelopes (significant lethal effects, first lethal effects and 
irreversible injury). Gravity is categorised depending on the number of victims for each type of 
effect assessed. A national scale is imposed with five categories of gravity. 
 
Gravity Significant lethal effect 
threshold 
Lethal effect threshold Irreversible effect 
threshold 
Disastrous >10 >100 >1000 
Catastrophic 1 to 10 10 to 100 100 to 1000 
Major 1 1 to 10 10 to 100 
Serious 0 1 1 to 10 
Moderate 0 0 <1 
TAB I.3: Gravity scale depending on the intensity (effect threshold) and on the number of exposed people) 
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Once the hazardous phenomena and major accidents have been characterized in the safety report 
according to probability and gravity scales, the Prefect supported by DRIRE could use a national 
acceptability matrix to make decision. Three areas are defined:  
- An unacceptable area (graded NON) for which the risk is deemed too high: the installation 
cannot be authorised in its current state. 
- An acceptable area for which authorisation can be given. 
- An intermediate area (graded MMR for risk control measures) in which authorisation is given 
after verification that all risk control measures at an acceptable cost have been put in place. 
 
 
TAB I.4 - The MMR risk matrix 
 
2.4.3 PPRT national regulatory principle 
The following zoning principles are set out in the national PPRT guide. 
 
 
TAB I.5 - PPRT zoning principles 
 
These general zoning principles are related to the aléas levels (combination of intensity and cumulative 
probability): 
 
TAB I.6 – General zoning principles. 
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2.5 Environmental assessment  
 
Impact of major accident hazards involving the natural environment should be included in the Safety 
Report (or, whereas the plant is subject to EIA procedure, in the impact report).  
 
2.6 Subjects and competences: transparency of the process - involvement of the public 
 
Land – Use Plan: After the approval from the side of the involved Authorities, the Land-Use Plan 
(PLU) is submitted to the community’s enquiry.  
Safety Report: The Safety Report is accessible to the public. A non-technical abstract, including 
dangerous phenomena maps, shall be provided, to facilitate public understanding of the information 
therein. 
Information to the public: The 2003 law allowed the creation of local risk-information committees 
(CLIC) around top-tier Seveso sites by the Prefect. This committee may call upon the expertise of 
recognised experts, in particular to carry out third-party investigations. It is kept informed of any 
incident or accident that may affect the security of the facilities specified above. For particular purpose 
of the PPRT, the principle of dialogue with local stakeholders established throughout the process. 
Dialogue takes two forms: 
 
- Partnership: this brings partners together through participation at working meetings and 
consultation over the PPRT project. The partnership is made up of the CLIC (Local Information 
and Dialogue Committee), the operators of the industrial sites, the relevant communes and the 
intercommunal bodies that handle land-use planning. 
- Dialogue: this brings the general public together and aims to create a common risk culture with 
local stakeholders. This happens through information and exchange meetings, distribution of 
PPRT documents, etc. 
- Public enquiry: Before approval the PPRT project is submitted to the community’s enquiry.  
 
3. GERMANY 
 
Upper Tier establishments Lower tier establishments 
Year 2003:  971 
Year 2004:  988 
Year 2005:  979 
Year 2003:  877 
Year 2004:  905 
Year 2005:  976 
 
Background85 
Germany is a federal country consisting of 16 States or Länder. The relationship between the national, 
federal administration and the states is regulated within the “Basic Law” – Grundgesetz, legislative and 
executive competency being divided between them. Land use planning in Germany is regulated within 
a number of statutes at federal and state level. 
3.1 Operating permits procedure - Licensing 
Federal law (Federal Pollution Protection Act – BImSchG) determines the rules for granting licenses for 
potentially polluting or hazardous installations or activities according to the Annex of the 4th Ordinance 
for the Implementation of the Federal Pollution Protection Act – 4. BImSchV86). This licensing 
procedure includes the granting of the Building Permit and the compliance with the spatial planning 
                                                 
85 ISW, Spatial Planning in Germany, www.isw.de 
86 Vierte Verordnung zur Durchführung des Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes (Verordnung über 
genehmigungsbedürftige Anlagen -4. BImSchV), 14 March 1997 last amended 15 July 2006 
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legislation. This applies to the procedure for granting planning permission as well as to the substantive 
requirements to be met when carrying out specific projects with a view to avoiding project-related 
hazards. An application for a license may be refused if the particular site is not suitable for the desired 
land use, 
Recommendations have existed for separation distances between residential areas and 
potentially polluting activities since the late 1970s. The aim is to prevent serious nuisances or 
hazards in the neighbourhood due to air pollution or noise.87 
 
3.2 Territorial governance & German planning instruments  
The Raumordnungsgesetz (ROG) – Spatial Planning Act is federal legislation which regulates the 
general land use planning at national level and defines the mechanisms and principles by which the 
states and other public bodies should carry out their spatial planning at a regional and local level. The 
Baugesetzbuch (BauGB) – Federal Building Code is federal legislation which defines in detail the 
procedure for carrying out land use planning from the regional level down to the detailed urban 
planning. The classifications of the type of use for which an area may be designated within the urban 
plan are defined within the Baunutzungsverordnung (BauNVO) – Federal Land Use Ordinance. This 
legislation sets the framework for the German zoning principle in the land-use planning which has 
existed since the 1950s. 
The sixteen states have the responsibility to take the goals and principles defined at the federal level and 
turn them into spatial development aims for state and regional planning. This is carried out via the 
Landesplanungsgesetz (LplG) of the individual States – State Planning Law. The states are also 
responsible for the coordination and approval of public and private infrastructure with wider ranging 
spatial relevance, e.g. airports, major roads. 
The central planning competence in Germany is anchored at the local level. Here several types and 
hierarchies of planning exist. The municipalities are obliged to formulate two types of statutory land use 
plans. The preparatory land use plan (Flächennutzungsplan, Scale 1:5000 to 1: 15000 according to the 
area of the municipality) constitutes a framework instrument, while the legally binding land-use plan 
(Bebauungsplan, scale usually 1:1000) serves as a regulatory instrument. The preparatory land-use plan 
covers the entire area of the municipality and indicates "the intended development of the community". 
It is binding for all public bodies; private actors are neither bound by it nor can they base any claims for 
building permission on it. The legally binding land-use plan is more detailed, defining functions and 
intensity of use, basic urban design principles and the allocation of public infrastructure. Environmental 
aspects are an important consideration together with public safety. This legally binding land-use plan is 
"evolved" from the preparatory land-use plan. This means that it need not be an enlarged copy; however 
it may not contain major deviations. If these are deemed necessary, the preparatory land-use plan must 
be amended in a parallel process. Land-use plans usually determine which kinds of land-use are 
permissible in the respective parts of a town to which the plans apply (e.g. industrial areas; areas for 
various kinds of uses like housing, trade, etc.; area purely or predominately reserved to housing; and so 
on). 
The legal provisions dealing with issues of spatial planning at different levels (national, state, and local) 
need to be strictly distinguished from State laws regulating safety and construction issues of buildings 
(Building Regulations Bauordnungsrecht / Bauaufsichtsrecht of the 16 Länder). 
The different levels of land use planning are listed below: 
 
                                                 
87 Abstände zwischen Industrie- bzw. Gewerbegebieten und Wohngebieten im Rahmen der Bauleitplanung und 
sonstige für den Immissionsschutz bedeutsame Abstände (Abstandserlass), MBl. NW. 1998, P. 744 
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 Level Decision making 
1 Bund (Federation)  Legislation for federal spatial planning 
(Raumordnung), including material principles  
 Legislation for local planning  
2 Bundesland 
(Federal State) 
 Legislation for state spatial planning 
(Landesplanung), including sub-regional 
planning (Regionalplanung)  
 Establishment of State Development 
Programme (Landesentwicklungsprogramm)  
 Legislation on State Building Code 
(Landesbauordnung) 
3 Region (Sub-
Region) 
 Establishment of sub-regional plan State 
Development Programme (Regionalplan), 
coordinating state and local development goals 
4 Municipal council  Establishment of land use plan 
(Flächennutzungsplan) indicating the intended 
spatial development for the community  
 Fixes in statute (Satzung) as legally binding 
local plans (Bebauungspläne) for limited areas 
to be evolved from land-use plan  
TAB I. 7 - The competency for spatial planning of various levels of government88 
Land-use planning connected to risk is regulated more at the level 2, 3 and 4 (States and 
municipalities), the municipalities are responsible for the more detailed planning (buildings, exact 
position, etc.). Within the German zoning system the designation of the use of particular areas must be 
"appropriate", i.e. industrial areas may not border directly on residential areas, moreover they should be 
separated by a suitable other type of use such as green-belt, commercial zone, etc. .  
3.3 Systematic method in use for LUP in risky areas 
German guidance on separation distances for major accident hazards 
In 2005 the Guidance "SFK/TAA-GS-189" was published jointly by the German Hazardous Incidents 
Commission (SFK) and the German Technical Committee for Plant Safety (TAA)90. The Guidance 
gives recommendations for separation distances between establishments under the German Major 
accidents Ordinance (Störfall-Verordnung) and Areas requiring protection within the framework of 
Land-Use Planning. 
The policies according to Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Seveso II Directive are defined in Germany in 
the Federal Building Code (BauGB) together with the associated Federal Land Use Ordinance 
(BauNVO) and in Section 50 of the Federal Pollution Protection Act (BImSchG). The consideration of 
appropriate separation distances should enable that the effects of major accidents in establishments on 
neighbouring sensitive objects may be avoided as far as possible. 
                                                 
88 nofdp - nature-oriented flood damage prevention, Description of the German Spatial Planning System, 
http://nofdp.bafg.de/servlet/is/13222/?lang=en,  
89 SFK/TAA-GS-1 ,Recommendations for separation distances between establishments under the Major accidents 
Ordinance and Areas requiring protection within the framework of Land-Use Planning - Implementation of § 50 
Federal Pollution Protection Law (BImSchG), developed by the SFK/TAA Working Group "Land-Use Planning", 
http://www.kas-bmu.de/publikationen/sfk_gb/sfk-taa-gs-1k-en.pdf (short Version) 
90 Note: The SFK and the TAA were set up pursuant to Sections 31a (repealed) and 51a of the Federal Pollution 
Protection Act under the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. In 
November 2005 SFK and TAA merged together to form the Commission on Process Safety (KAS). 
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The separation distance recommendations are only related to people as the subject to be protected, they 
are not suitable for the assessment of current mixed situations (existing buildings), for the licensing 
procedure under BImSchG or as the basis for the external emergency planning. 
On reaching or exceeding the recommended separation distances, it may be generally assumed that the 
effects of a major accident within an establishment, based on the assumptions made, will not lead to a 
serious hazard as defined in the German Major Accident Ordinance for the population. 
Probabilistic risk assessment as carried out in the Netherlands and the UK does not have an equivalent 
use in Germany. There are a number of reasons for this: 
• German major accident policy and legislation have, up until now, only considered a 
deterministic approach which is "consequence based". 
• Establishments which fall under the requirements of the Seveso II Directive in Germany are 
required to be erected, and operated according to the "State of the Art in Safety Technology". 
This is a dynamic process which takes account of current technical regulations and standards as 
well as developments in technology. 
• The application of "State of the Art Safety Technology" should therefore mean that the risks of 
effects of an accident outside of the establishment are negligible. 
The method generally used is of the “consequence-based” type. In exceptional cases different tools are 
applied, e g. probabilistic assessment (with certain conventions, as the pre-selected scenario) or a case – 
by – case approach (e.g. for existing situations).  
The general used “consequence – based” approach refers to pre-selected “worst credible” or 
“representative” scenarios. With respect to fertilizers (ammonium nitrate) and explosives generic 
approaches are occasionally used, while in the case of LPG applicable standard scenarios (like the 
BLEVE) are adopted. In any case, it must be underlined that the evaluation of the safety distance that 
moves from the ‘worst credible scenario” is based on:  
 
the maximum permitted amount of substance, its temperature and pressure;  
the vulnerability of the surrounding environment.  
Regarding the effects, the criteria adopted to define the compatibility are: 
Injuries or fatalities of a large number of people. 
Material damage. 
Individual/societal risk (only in exceptional cases) 
 
Examples for endpoints values used in the German practice are reported below: 
Endpoint values adopted to assess risk tolerability in Germany  
Toxic: ERPG* 2 
* Emergency Response Planning 
Guidelines91 
Thermal radiation: 1,6 kW/ m2 Overpressure : 0,1 bar 
TAB I.8 – Endpoint values adopted in the German regulation. 
 
 
3.4 What “tolerable” means in the German regulation - status of the adopted criteria 
The SFK/TAA-Recommendations are guidance and the endpoints should be considered as target-
criteria. The application is left to the individual State and the executive authorities at regional and local 
level, which, where justified, may adopt other values. 
                                                 
91 For explanation see chapter IV 
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The tolerability of risks under the German Major Accident Ordinance is governed by the concept that 
“establishments may only carry out their hazardous activities if they are able to demonstrate that 
hazardous effects from an accident may be reasonably excluded” .  
This is based on technical regulation and expert judgement. This does not however preclude all and 
every single accident. 
 
3.5 Environmental assessment  
With respect to the natural environment, the risk acceptability evaluation is often carried out in 
combination with the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment).  
 
3.6 Subjects and competences: transparency of the process - involvement of the public 
Regional and Local Authorities are responsible for the whole procedure, with the Municipality as final 
decision-maker. Different assignments and responsibilities are regulated by law (Federal Building Code 
and Federal Pollution Control Act). The public is informed through official publications and 
consultation procedures regulated by law. 
 
4. ITALY 
 
Top- tier establishments* Lower- tier establishments* 
532                                         610  
* last inventory: 2007 
 
Background  
Historically structured as a Central State government, the Republic of Italy, since the 90’s has been 
characterized by an ongoing process of devolution to transfer some roles to the regions. The devolution 
process from national authorities to regions has been carried out by legislative provisions and an 
amendment to the 117th article of the Constitution, which has increasingly enhanced the responsibilities 
of local-level institutions, represented by the 20 regions (one of them with two autonomous provinces), 
their provinces and municipalities. Currently, Regions can adopt  their own legislation concerning 
protection of the environment, and other general-interest matters as civil protection, natural resources 
protection and (local) economical development. In particular, Regions have a central role in land 
governance. Provinces and municipalities can adopt regulations with regard to the matters mentioned 
above.   
Consequently, the Land Use Planning (LUP) is based on 4 different stages, regulated by the National 
Urban Law, that sets guiding principles and establishes different roles of regional, provincial and 
municipal authorities.  
Within this process, each region has the power to implement national laws having direct implication 
with general-interest issues as protection of the environment, control of major-accident hazards, safety, 
health, etc. As a consequence, in Italy the Seveso II Directive has been implemented not only by the 
legislative decree n. 334/99 (law of first level) and by the Ministerial Decree 9 May 2001 (law of 
second level), that dictate the national criteria for Land Use Planning, but also by regional legislation. 
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According to the mentioned laws, a municipality must receive a technical advice, given by a Regional 
Technical Committee92, before giving a building permit in one of the cases of the art. 12 of the 
96/82/EC Directive. The technical permission may be expressed on case by case or during the drawing 
up of specific planning tools (Technical Paper on LUP). 
The Italian regulation states the following procedure: 
 
• Phase 1 – activation of the project affecting the town or territorial  instrument, due to a change 
in the context, or to a preliminary general verification of the existing conditions: 
1. new settlements; 
2. modification of the settling asset, according to art 10, paragraph 1, of the legislative decree 17 
August 1999, n. 334; 
3. new settlements or infrastructure around the existing settlements, such as, for example, 
communication roads, sites open to the public, residential areas, when localisation or settlement 
or infrastructure may worsen the hazard level or the consequences of a relevant accident. 
• Phase 2 – identification of the territorial and environmental elements. 
Territorial elements according to edification index and specific elements. 
(table 1 of MD 9 may 2001 - territorial categories, from Cat A - iff93 > 4,5 mc/sm – to Cat E iff 
≤ 0,5 mc/mq – and Cat F concerning plants) Environmental aspects based on environmental 
themes potentially included in a major hazard context: landscape and environmental heritage 
(governmental decree 42/2004); natural protected areas, such as parks and other areas identified 
by the regulation; superficial waters (such as superficial water, primary and secondary 
hydrograph systems, water corps according to circulation  times and basin volume); deep 
waters (such as capitation wells for potable or irrigous water; protected or not protected deep 
water resource; recharging water stratum); land use (such as valuable cultivated areas, woods). 
• Phase 3 – validation of territorial and environmental compatibility of settlements. 
The examination of territorial compatibility is based on a maximum level that cannot be 
exceeded: below it, it is conventionally agreed that there will not be damage; over the level the 
damage is supposed to occur. Table 2 shows the risk for people and buildings in terms of 
maximum limits. 
 
4.1. Operating permits procedure 
 
Due to the three-levels structure of Italian governance (Regions – Provinces – Municipalities), licensing 
procedures are carried out by regional authorities (responsible for lower-tier establishments) and the 
Regional Technical Committee (responsible for upper-tier establishments). In detail, the operators of 
upper-tier establishments  must submit a preliminary safety report to the CTR and receive its positive 
technical permission, in order to obtain the building permit. The preliminary safety report must be 
drawn up in case of new installations and substantial modifications of existing establishments. The 
preliminary investigation carried out by CTR is the pre-condition to get operational permits and land-
use permissions; according to Ministerial Decree 9 May 2001, minimal safety requirements are to be 
fulfilled. 
                                                 
92 Regional Technical Committees (CTR): technical authorities regarding hazardous industries at the regional 
level, composed of members of the Regional Fire Departments, National Authority for Prevention and safety at 
work (ISPESL) and of other local authorities, such as the Regional Agency for Environmental protection (ARPA). 
They also assess Safety Reports elaborated by the operators of Seveso establishments, and ensure that Safety 
Management Systems have been elaborated. After the transfer of competencies about Seveso establishments, the 
role of the CTR will be played by technical authorities under the control of each Region. 
93 Iff = in Italian is the “indice di fabbricabilità fondiaria”, which is the building land index and represents the 
building volume capacity in a specific area, according to which it is possible to acknowledge the maximum 
density of settled inhabitants. 
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4.2 Land governance & Italian planning instruments 
 
Planning procedures 
The devolution of administrative and legislative powers from national to local authorities, due to 
Legislative Decree 31 March 1998 n.112 and successive amendment to the 117th article of the 
Constitution, has changed both roles and subjects connected with the matter of land governance in Italy, 
extending regional role. 
Responsibilities and power of regional, provincial and municipal authorities progressively increased, 
and now regions and provinces have the power to define their own statutes and (in the case of the 
regions) their laws concerning crucial themes as regional planning, town-planning principles and 
criteria, social security, industrial safety and civil protection. The Central Government sets general 
principles and guidelines, implementing European Directives. As far as the implementation of the 
Seveso Directive is concerned the principal national law is the Legislative Decree 334/99. The 14th 
article of the Decree, providing control of urbanization, has been implemented by the Ministerial 
Decree 9 May 2001, concerning “Minimal Safety requirements for the urban and territorial planning in 
the areas subject to major accident risks”. 
 
The implementation of the Ministerial Decree 9 May 2001, within the ordinary land-use planning 
regulation, can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
 RISK REGULATION PLANNING REGULATION 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT Transposes the Seveso II Directive 
by Legislative Decree 334/99, which 
LUP regulation is defined by the 
MD 9 May 2001 
National Urban Law defines 
principles and objectives of National 
interest. The Law must be 
implemented by all the 20 regions 
and the 2 autonomous provinces. 
REGIONS Adopt regional laws implementing 
national legislation; ensure the 
enforcement of procedures and the 
assignment of responsibilities. 
Define regional plans, that give 
planning objectives to provinces and 
municipalities and contain specific 
provisions regarding matters of 
regional interest.    
PROVINCES Within their territorial plans, define 
areas “subjected to specific 
regulation”; set principles for urban 
plans.  
Define territorial plans, where goods 
subjected to provincial 
responsability (protected areas, 
transportation routes, etc) are 
disciplined; set principles for urban 
plans. 
MUNICIPALITIES Define the technical paper on LUP, 
in which risks connected to 
establishments and vulnerable 
elements are represented in a 
common and easy-reading 
cartographic base. Land-uses are 
disciplined on the base of this 
document. 
Define the urban plan on the base of 
the directives of given by  province 
and region, assign property rights, 
and discipline use of goods 
subjected to their responsibility. The 
plan is subjected to public 
consultation after its publication in 
the Official Journal 
TAB 1.9 – Assignment of responsibilities in the Italian Competent Authorities framework. 
 
Within this framework, and in order to insert the technological risk evaluation within the ordinary 
territorial planning practice, the Ministry of Infrastructure has developed a specific programme94 for 
                                                 
94 Refer to http://www.infrastrutturetrasporti.it/sites/seveso2/pages/sev_page_05.htm  
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technical assistance to Authorities dealing with the implementation of th DM 9 maggio 2001. The 
programme includes the appointment of a scientific committee involving representatives from both 
institutional and non-institutional parties. With the emanation of the 1st amendment to the Seveso II (the 
Directive 2003/105/EC), within the Italian implementation (Legislative Decree 238/05) the need for 
Guidelines for the implementation of the DM 9 Maggio 2001 was underlined. Finally, further regulation 
will take into account the possibility of integrating the matter of technological risk within the territorial 
management general regulation together with the definition of instruments to assess the economical and 
social sustainability.  
 
4.3 Systematic method in use for LUP in risky areas 
 
Specific regulations are in place for high standard storages and all other establishments in which 
substances classified as “Seveso” are present. For LPG storages and toxic/flammable liquids storages 
specific national decrees have been issued, and a risk assessment (‘semi-quantitative method”) 
methodology is used. The methodology integrates probabilistic elements applying an index method 
which defines the likelihood of an accident scenario. Each accidental situation is considered case-by-
case and impact areas are identified using defined threshold values. Concerning the other dangerous 
substances a semi-quantitative approach is used to assess both the frequencies of the expected events 
and the deriving effects. In so doing, the regulation refers to the national legislation on dangerous 
substances, the Legislative Decree 334/99. The land-use decision is based on the specific requirements 
of the Ministerial Decree 9 May 2001, where the categories of frequencies and effects are combined 
with 6 categories of vulnerability, as the following table shows: 
 
EFFECTS categories (Estimated damage) Frequency of the 
event (classes) Elevated mortality Mortality Irreversible damage Reversible damage 
< 10-6 DEF CDEF BCDEF ABCDEF 
10-4 – 10-6 EF DEF CDEF BCDEF 
10-3 – 10-4 F EF DEF CDEF 
> 10-3 F F EF DEF 
TAB I.10 – Compatibility matrix of the Italian MD 9 may 2001 – the different words indicate different 
vulnerability category of the land. 
 
The compatible localization of the targets, classified in decreasing vulnerable categories from A to F, is 
estimated on the base of the overlap between frequencies and effects. 
The criteria are those of lethality, initial lethality, irreversible injuries, reversible injuries and material 
damages (domino effect) due to: 
 
• stationary thermal radiation; 
• instantaneous thermal radiation (i.e. flash fire); 
• overpressure and missile projection by UVCE/CVE; 
• toxic release. 
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Endpoints are reported in the following table: 
 
high lethality starting lethality 
irreversible 
lesions 
reversible 
lesions 
Damages 
tostructures / 
domino effects  Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fire 
(stationary thermal 
radiation) 
12,5 kW/m2 7 kW/m2 5 kW/m2 3 kW/m2 12,5 kW/m2 
BLEVE/Fireball 
(variable thermal 
radiation) 
fireball radius 350 kJ/m2 200 kJ/m2 125 kJ/m2 200-800 m (*) 
Flash-fire 
(instantaneous thermal 
radiation) 
LFL ½ LFL    
VCE 
(overpressure) 
0,3 bar 
(0,6 spazi 
aperti) 
0,14 bar 0,07 bar 0,03 bar 0,3 bar 
Toxic release 
(absorbed dose) 
LC50 
(30min,hmn)  IDLH   
(*) related to the typology of the tank   
TAB I.11- Endpoint values adopted in the Italian regulation. 
 
As deriving from the reported tables, if a vulnerable element (for example: a “B” target, representing a 
hospital with less than 100 scholars) is exposed to a level of risk (frequencies, damages or both) higher 
than allowed, additional safety measures are required. 
 
4.4 What “tolerable” means in the Italian regulation - status of the adopted criteria 
 
Both for LPG storages and dangerous substances, the thresholds values of the criteria are legally 
binding and must not be exceeded in any case. 
Also the definition of the target vulnerability is regulated by law: the Ministerial Decree 9 May 2001 
establishes criteria and thresholds for each urban and natural element that can be involved in an 
accident. The general criterion is the one of more or less easy evacuation of the population. The criteria 
are translated in several indicators, like for example, the number of beds in a hospital (> 25 = A, ≤ 25 = 
B), the number of scholars in a school, the number of floors in buildings calculated on the basis of the 
index of edification (the rate between m3/m2) of each land’s portion. 
This strictly quantitative approach requires the planning authorities to monitor the development of the 
urban elements constantly, in order to furnish updated data each time a risk evaluation becomes 
necessary. 
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4.5 Environmental assessment 
 
The evaluation of natural vulnerability, as defined in the Ministerial Decree 9 May 2001, has been 
showing some problems during its implementation, and further studies are currently under 
development. The proposed criterion is to measure the time necessary to restore the original state of a 
natural element in case of an accident. This approach implies, the evaluation of natural vulnerability on 
the base of possible or less possible restoration of its initial state after having been involved in an 
accident; the corresponding threshold is > 2 year = incompatible, < 2 years = compatible. 
 
4.6 Subjects and competences: transparency of the process - involvement of the public 
 
Accessibility to information in the safety report (with the exception of some industrial, commercial or 
personal information not available for public consultation on operator’s request, and those related to 
public security or national defence) is ensured and ordinary consultation procedures are prescribed by 
planning regulation (a consultation period, after publication of urban plans in the Official Journals). In 
case of establishments submitted also to EIA and IPPC directives, authorities responsible for 
administrative procedures must ensure public information and consultation, according to legislation in 
force.  
 
5. THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Top- tier establishments  Lower- tier establishments  
138  172  
 
Background 
The most densely populated European country, the Kingdom of The Netherlands, has developed its 
safety regulation since the ‘80’s, when the increase of the use of LPG became evident together with the 
connected storage problems. Extensive studies on LPG led to the development of quantitative 
assessment procedures and, in the light of the scarcity of land, to the development of sophisticated 
quantitative criteria for the evaluation of risk acceptability based on the likelihood of occurrence of the 
events. 
Divided in 12 Provinces and 480 Municipalities, The Netherlands are well known for being an under-
sea level territory for a main part of their extension. The area called “Randstad” (comprising cities as 
The Hague, Rotterdam, Leiden, Haarlem and Amsterdam) is up to 30 meters under the sea level and, 
due to the presence of the main industries and commercial harbours, it is also the most populated. 
Consequently, “safety” matters in The Netherlands are instinctively connected with flood risks, and the 
probabilistic approach developed for their management in the ’70 has led to the current safety culture 
addressed, firstly, to the quantification of the probability of occurrence of the events for which usually 
enormous interventions are required.  
 
5.1 Operation permits procedure 
 
In the Netherlands, a full QRA is required in the phase of permit application for the installation of new 
establishments, as well as for modifications of existing situations. The coordination role for external 
safety matters has been assigned to the VROM (Spatial Planning, Housing & Environment Ministry) 
who decided to establish the External Safety Directorate as specific implementation body. According to 
current legislation, operation permit are subordinated to a fulfilment of the environmental quality 
defined in External Safety (Establishment) Decree. 
5.2 Territorial governance & Dutch planning instruments  
 
 71
Planning procedure 
Dutch public authority is defined as a ‘gedecentraliseerde eenheidsstaat’, that means that a 
decentralization in the competences of government, provinces and municipalities is in place. This three 
main levels of government - having direct reflection in the territorial governance – are, according to 
Dutch constitution, not hierarchically organized, since each of them have the own powers and 
competences; obviously, supervision from one level to the other, based on geographical scale, is in 
place.  
The main legal reference for land-use planning in The Netherlands are the Spatial Planning Act and the 
Environment Management Act of the Minister for Housing, Spatial planning and Environment, 
competent for drawing national policy on spatial planning as well as the official ‘National Policy on 
Spatial Planning’ (NPSP). The latter is a document that is updated once every five years and it contains 
specific aspects of the national policy on spatial planning; it may comprise national structure outline 
plans, national structure policy sector plans and concrete policy decisions that are of importance to the 
national spatial planning policy. The SPA prescribes an adoption procedure for the NPSP, including an 
advice of the State Town and Country Planning Commission, a stage of public consultation and, in the 
end, the adoption by parliament.  
Under the SPA, Provinces and Municipalities may adopt a Regional Spatial Plan (RSP) for the entire 
area of the province/municipality or for one or more parts in which developments are planned. At the 
local level, three spatial policy plans are elaborated: the Structure Plan, the Individual Project procedure 
and the Local Land Use Plan. The latter is legally binding and it regulates the use of the land for a 
period covering up to 10 years. It also regulates the safety around hazardous installations. 
 
5.3 Systematic method in use for LUP in risky areas 
Until 1993 (hence, previously to the emanation of the Seveso II) the prevention of major hazards and 
the protection of population & environment was up to the Nuisance Act. For “stationary” hazardous 
activity, a license under the Act was required. This procedure ensured that no nuisance was caused to 
the surroundings of the plants.  
This regulation has been replaced with the Environmental Protection Act and, concerning the specific 
topic of risk assessment, with the Hazard of Major Accident Decree (BRZO 1999) implemented for 
LUP by the External Safety Decree (2004). The EPA states that an establishment must obtain a unique 
license for all the environmental effects it may cause outside its boundaries (air, water, soil, accidental 
events, etc), and that safety reports have to be submitted for the other environmental certifications; the 
External Safety Decree regulates the environmental quality requirements to be set for external safety 
when a land-use decision is taken. 
Concerning the risk assessment methodology, the Dutch approach is based on three guiding principles:  
• the quantification of the risk through an analytical approach accounting probabilities; 
• the evaluation of the individual risk and the definition of thresholds of acceptability; 
• the evaluation of the societal risk.  
The last step involves the calculation and the representation of location-based risk contours and of a 
societal-risk diagram. For both, legal definitions are given: 
• individual risk is the probability that an average unprotected person present at a point around an 
hazardous installation gets killed consequently to an accident; 
• societal risk is the probability that a group of more than N persons gets killed due to an accident 
deriving from an hazardous installation. 
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FIG I.2 -Steps involved in Dutch QRA (adapted from VROM, 2005) 
 
The Dutch legislation defines legally binding thresholds for individual risk, and gives target criteria for 
societal one. Nevertheless, it requires to Municipalities to document how the societal one is taken into 
account in their planning decisions.  
The subjects to be protected are the “vulnerable” objects as hospitals, residential areas, schools; the 
“less vulnerable” objects are considered buildings, hotels, restaurants, shops, etc. The distinction is 
relevant only to location-based risk, and endpoints values are prescribed. For vulnerable objects, the 
limit value is that of the lethal effect area to which 10-6 events/year frequency is associated; in the area 
comprised between 10-5 and 10-6 events/year, less vulnerable objects are possible in exceptional cases 
that has to be motivated. At the moment, CA’s have three years for the entry into force of the Decree in 
which they have to achieve compliance with the limit value of 10-5 per annum for all the vulnerable 
objects in the vicinity of the establishments falling under the BRZO or in the vicinity of LGP 
installation; this target is of 10-6 by the end of 2010. 
 
5.4 What “tolerable” means in the Dutch regulation - status of the adopted criteria 
The value prescribed for the individual (location-based) risk of 10-6 is legally binding for vulnerable 
objects, while a target value of 10-5 applies to less vulnerable objects. For the societal risk, evaluations 
are carried out case-by-case but no limiting values are in place.  
 
5.5 Environmental assessment 
The procedure that regards Seveso plants is regulated, besides the Major Hazard Decree of 1999, by the 
Environmental Management Act which regulates all the environmental impacts of dangerous 
installations.   
 
5.6 Subjects and competences: transparency of the process - involvement of the public 
External Safety is regulated directly by the Ministries involved in the procedure: next to VROM, other 
Ministries are the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Economics. 
Within the VROM the External Safety Directorate has been established. Traditionally, The Netherlands 
pay great attention to its active environmental communities and participation and consultation with the 
public is guaranteed.  
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ANNEX II 
 
TWG5 - QUESTIONNAIRE 
Purpose 
 
Objective 1 of the Technical Working Group on Land-Use Planning requires the Group to “Give the 
principles of “good practice” in Land-Use Planning and describe the underlying principles of 
risk/hazard assessment that will support this (e.g. consistency, transparency, robustness, etc)”. In order 
to deal with this objective in a more operational way and to collect information on the current status of 
“good practice” within the Member States, this Questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire should 
be completed by the experts of the Plenary Group or by the Competent Authorities. It is up to the 
responders to do this based entirely on own knowledge or to gather the information also from other 
bodies, e. g. planning authorities or regional/local authorities. 
 
1. Data of the responder to the Questionnaire: 
Name:  
E-mail:  
Organisation:  
Country:  
 
Type of authority:         EWG-LUP expert           /        Competent Authority  
 
2. Is a systematic hazard/risk assessment method for industrial hazards in the context of Land Use 
Planning used in your country (either on national or on regional/local level)? 
 Yes 
 Some regions/municipalities 
 No 
 
If No, what is the basis for answering the “Methodology” Section of this Questionnaire?  
 Internal discussions possibly leading to the adoption of the methodology suggested 
 Personal opinion 
 Official working group opinion preparing a methodology 
 
 
A. Methodology for Land Use Planning 
 
A1. What hazard/risk assessment method are you using in your Country?95 
 Full probabilistic (many accident scenarios – chosen case-by-case - quantifying both 
frequencies and consequences and basing decisions on their combination) 
 Probabilistic with certain conventions (pre-selected scenarios) 
 Consequence-based (worst case scenario) 
 Consequence-based (pre-selected ‘worst-credible’ or ‘representative’ scenarios) 
 Semi-quantitative method (please give details) 
 Generic approach (pre-selected scenarios for plant categories) 
 Generic distances, not calculated individually 
                                                 
95 Multiple answers possible 
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 Case-by-case 
 Other (please explain) 
 
A2. Is there a combination of generic approaches and specific assessments?  
  Generic approaches are generally used. No specific assessment permitted  
 Generic approaches are generally used. Specific assessment is sometimes permitted. Specify 
when:  
 Generic approaches are occasionally used. Specify when:  
  Generic approaches are never used. Always a specific assessment is required.  
 
A3. What effects of major accidents have been chosen as criteria in order to assess the acceptability 
(tolerability) of Major Accident Hazards?3  
 Individual/ Societal Risk 
 Acute (short-term) fatalities 
  Total number of fatalities (Acute + Latent)  
 Number of Fatalities and Injuries 
 Injuries of large number of people 
 Material Damage 
 Other (please describe)  
 
A4. What respective hazard/risk levels (endpoints) have been chosen as criteria in order to assess the 
acceptability (tolerability) of major accident hazards? Which values have been adopted? 
 Individual  risk of fatality                Value: 
 Both Individual and Societal Risk of fatality               Values:  
  Individual Risk of receiving a dangerous dose or worse Value: 
 Effects – toxic                                                                         Value:  
 Effects – thermal radiation                                                      Value: 
 Effects – overpressure                                                             Value:                                                                          
 Material damage                                                                      Value:                                                                         
 Other (please describe)  
 
A5. Please specify how effects to the environment are included into the assessment of the acceptability 
of Major Accident Hazards? 
 
A6. Do less strict values apply for existing situations?  
  Yes (please specify) 
   No 
  
A7. What restrictions in possible Land Uses/Developments apply within the relevant zones? 
 Totally restricted use  
 Zoning system dependent on generic use categories 
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 Zoning system dependent on societal risk 
   Case-by-case 
 Other (specify) 
 
A8. What status do the criteria have?  
 Boundary values included in the national or regional legislation that in no circumstances are 
allowed to be exceeded 
 Boundary values included in the national or regional legislation that can be exceeded under 
exceptional circumstances (procedure for doing that is in place) 
  Recommended target values (deviation is possible by local/regional authorities upon 
justification) 
 Advised values (responsibility for following them stays entirely within the local/regional 
authorities) 
 Other (please describe)  
 
A9. What were the main considerations of giving the criteria this status?  
 
A10. If national or regional criteria for distances are established, are the local authorities allowed to 
perform specific Risk Assessment that would alter the national or regional advice?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
A11. Are there specific measures taken at a national level to reduce the uncertainty in the results of 
Risk Assessment (e.g. guidelines on tools, criteria, frequencies – standardisation – performance by 
accredited body – review by accredited body)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
A12. Are there specific measures addressing the impact on land use planning of new scientific 
knowledge on the criteria and methodology used? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
A13. How is the technical advice on the risks arising from the establishment provided?96 
 
A14. What authority holds responsibility for the final decision? 
 
                                                 
96 Please specify the type of body (governmental, private) and indicate the relationship to the authority responsible 
for LUP decisions 
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A15. Which other authorities are involved? Is there a link to the IPPC-procedure in case of new sitings 
or substantial changes?97 
 
A16. How is the assignment of responsibilities laid down to assure transparency and make the 
allocation of tasks evident to all involved bodies (e.g. national strategy plans, legal responsibilities 
etc.)? 
 
A17. How is the public informed to assure the transparency of the decision-making process? 
 
B. Implementation of Art.12 from Seveso II 
 
B1. What procedure ensures that modifications of existing establishments are controlled in such a way 
that technical measures will be implemented in case the risks to people increase?98  
 
B2. What procedure ensures that new developments in the vicinity of an existing establishment are 
controlled?6  
 
B3. What procedure ensures that siting of new establishments is controlled in such a way that 
appropriate distances between new establishments and residential and other LUP-sensitive areas are 
maintained?6 
 
B4. What procedures are in place such that technical measures are taken so as not to increase the risk 
or consequences to people?6 
 
B5. What consultation procedure ensures that the public involved is informed and can influence the 
decisions to be taken? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Please note that Article 12 of Seveso II also includes “other related policies” e.g. permit procedures of all kind  
98 Please include in the answer how the monitoring of decisions is carried out in the respective cases 
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C. Properties constituting “Good practice” 
 
C1. Which properties do you believe that constitute ‘good practice’ in LUP? 
(Give your grade between 1 and 5, 1=not important, 5=extremely important to each element) 
 Transparency99                  1           2           3             4               5 
 Consistency 100                   1           2           3             4               5 
 Simplicity101                       1           2           3             4               5 
 Proportionality102               1           2           3             4               5 
 Robustness103                     1           2           3             4               5 
 Other (please describe and give your Grade)  
 
C2. Which elements of your system contribute most in achieving these properties? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 “Transparency” means that the methodology has to assure a clear understanding of the decision-making process 
100 “Consistency” means that outcomes of the assessment of broadly similar situations are broadly the same under 
similar conditions 
101 “Simplicity” means the avoidance of unnecessary complexity 
102 “Proportionality” refers to the balance of constraints with the level of risk 
103 “Robustness” is a super-structural term which includes other properties and expresses the probability how valid 
a decision will be over time 
European Commission 
 
EUR 23519 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
Title: Implementing art. 12 of Seveso II Directive, Overwiev of Roadmaps for Land Use Planning in Selected 
Member States 
Author(s): Claudia Basta, Delft University of Technology, Civil Engineer Faculty, Section of Material Science and 
Sustainable Construction, Stevinweg 1, 5048 GA Delft, The Netherlands 
Michael Struckl, Major Accidents Hazards Bureau,  
Michalis Christou, Major Accidents Hazards Bureau. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
2008 – 82 pp. – 29.7 x 21 cm 
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1018-5593 
 
Abstract 
The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission is responsible for the coordination of the work of the European Working Group on 
Land Use Planning (hereinafter: EWGLUP), whose mandate is the development of Guidelines for the implementation of Art 12 of the 
Seveso II Directive as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC. These Guidelines, developed by the EWGLUP and agreed by the Member 
States at the 16th meeting of the Committee of Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of the Seveso Directive (Porvoo, 
October 2006), were adopted by the European Commission on 7 June 2007 
A preliminary research, exploring the state-of art of the implementation of Art 12 within the 25 Member States (MS) was conducted in 2004 
by the Major Accident Hazard Bureau of JRC in the form of a questionnaire-based survey. Final results were collected, analysed and finally 
updated up to spring 2007. A group of MS – the Netherlands, Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom – was selected for further 
analysis and invited to comment and revise the result of the investigation.  
The European Working Group on Land-Use Planning has, in addition to the development of Guidelines for implementation of Article 12 of 
the Seveso II Directive, as amended by Directive 105/2003/EC, taken part at the development of this document as a supporting tool 
addressing the issue of LUP in the context of hazardous facilities. The document provides supplementary information material describing in 
detail “good LUP practices” available within selected Member States and it has a twofold objective. Firstly, it reports the results of the survey 
concerning “good practice” for LUP in the context of the Seveso II. Secondly, it proposes implementation Roadmaps fulfilling Art. 12 
requirements. In that context it should be noted that its character is purely descriptive and informative and it cannot be used for guidance or 
normative purposes. At the same time, it is believed that the structured information provided can substantially help the Seveso competent 
authorities and planning authorities to deal with the land-use planning issue. The document is therefore published in the form of JRC 
Technical Report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can place 
an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by 
sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support 
for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a 
service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of 
science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves 
the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of special 
interests, whether private or national. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
